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Summary
Providing access to scientific and technical information for legitimate uses while
protecting it from potential terrorists is complex and poses difficult policy choices.
Federally funded, extramural academic research (basic and applied) is supposed to
be “classified” if it poses a security threat; otherwise, it is to be “unrestricted.”  Since
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, controls increasingly have been placed on
some types of unclassified research and scientific and technical information,
including information used to inform decision making and citizen oversight.  These
controls include “sensitive but unclassified” (SBU) labels; restrictive contract
clauses; visa controls; controlled laboratories; and the widening of legal restrictions
on access to some federal biological, transportation, critical infrastructure, geospatial,
environmental impact, and nuclear information.  On December 16, 2005, President
Bush instructed federal agencies to standardize procedures to designate, mark, and
handle SBU information, and to forward recommendations for government-wide
standards to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).  Federal agencies do not use
uniform definitions of SBU information or have consistent policies for safeguarding
or releasing it.  This lack of uniformity and consistency raises issues about how to
identify SBU information, especially scientific and technical information; how to
keep it from those who would use it malevolently, while allowing access for those
who need to use it; and how to develop uniform nondisclosure policies and penalties.
This issue also involves implementation of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).  Following the 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration issued
guidance that reversed the previous Administration’s “presumption of disclosure”
approach to releasing information under FOIA and cautioned agencies to consider
withholding SBU information if there was a “sound legal basis” to do so.  Some
agencies say that information labeled SBU is exempt from disclosure under FOIA,
even though such information per se is not exempt under FOIA.  In addition, the
2002 enactment of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), P.L.
107-347, rendered moot the definition of SBU that some agencies had used since the
passage of the Computer Security Act of 1987, P.L. 100-235, which identified
sensitive information by content.  FISMA requires all agencies to categorize the
criticality and sensitivity of all information, not just sensitive information, according
to three security control objectives — confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
information — across a range of risk levels and to use safeguards based on risk of
release.  Many federal agencies have not yet fully implemented these new procedures.
Several actions and proposals have been made to reconcile differences related
to these issues are: to standardize concepts of “sensitive” information (P.L. 109-90,
H.R. 2331); to modify penalties for disclosure (S. 494, S. 888, H.R. 1317, H.R.
3097); to clarify FOIA (S. 394, S. 589, S. 622, S. 1181, S. 1873, H.R. 867, and H.R.
1620); to widen the use of risk-based approaches to information control; to centralize
review, handling, and appeals processes; and to evaluate the impact of federal
policies on nongovernmental professional groups’ prepublication review and self-
policing of sensitive research.  This report will be updated as necessary.
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“Sensitive But Unclassified”Information and
Other Controls: Policy and Options for
Scientific and Technical Information
Introduction to the Issues 
Federal agencies have long confronted the need to balance the release of
information for public use with the need to withhold information that could be used
to threaten privacy or security.  The term “sensitive but unclassified” (SBU)
information was used before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, even though
there was (and is) no statutory definition for it.  Since 9/11 more agencies have
started to use the term “SBU,” or some variant of it, and to implement security
systems to identify and protect nonclassified information whose release might benefit
terrorists.  Many questions have been raised about how to design uniform policies
and controls for SBU information.  This report focuses on controls for two kinds of
scientific and technical information — information used in research and scientific
publication and information used to serve broader public policy purposes, such as in
regulatory decisionmaking and citizen oversight.  Both public and privately
controlled information are included and in some  respects, private professional
groups’ responses are being defined by public pressures and decisions.
Two divergent perspectives are discernable.  From one perspective, broadening
controls to deny public access to federal SBU information will constrain terrorists,
who might use it to threaten buildings, infrastructure, people, and services.  It has
been estimated that “our adversaries derive up to 80% of their intelligence from
open-source information.”1  Another source put this at 90%, referring to information
about local energy infrastructures, water reservoirs, dams, highly enriched uranium
storage sites, and nuclear and gas facilities.  Moreover, some say that the potential
for terrorism is heightened if terrorists can aggregate seemingly innocuous bits of
public information.2  Although many agencies have begun to limit public access to
sensitive information, from this perspective, these efforts are inadequate.
In contrast to those who seek to widen controls, another view contends that
inadequate and insufficient sharing of information with the public and among first
responders potentially weakens efforts to protect the nation from terrorist attacks.  A
related perspective is that as government policy on sharing information shifts to the
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3 The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
July 22, 2004, (also called The 9/11 Commission Report) encouraged the promotion of a
“need- to-share” culture, as opposed to a “need-to-know” culture of information protection,
focusing on the development of a “trusted information network” to make information more
accessible.  (Available at [http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf].)
4 This report updates CRS Report RL31845, “Sensitive But Unclassified” and Other
Federal Security Controls on Scientific and Technical Information: History and Current
Controversy, by Genevieve J. Knezo, which described the history of governmental controls
on “sensitive unclassified information.”
5 National Security Decision Directive-189 (NSDD-189), titled “National Policy on the
Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information” and issued on Sept. 21,
1985, says that if federally funded basic scientific and technical information produced at
colleges, universities and laboratories is to be controlled for national security reasons, it
should be classified. But, “... to the maximum extent possible, the products of fundamental
research remain unrestricted. It is also the policy ... that, where the national security requires
control, the mechanism for control of information generated during Federally funded
fundamental research in science, technology, and engineering at colleges, universities, and
laboratories is classification.”  “Fundamental research” is defined as “basic and applied
research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared
broadly within the scientific community....”  This policy is reflected in Executive Order
12958.  NSDD-189 is still in effect, as stated in a letter from the National Security Advisor
to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Issued by National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice on November 1, 2001).
“need to know” rationale that has become more prevalent since the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, the imposition of more controls will deny ordinary citizens information
relating to research, environmental protection, transportation, and so forth that they
need in order to be informed3 and to hold accountable government and industry
decisionmakers.  Some say new control policies unduly limit access to information
needed to advance the progress of science and technology and the development of
technologies to counter threats, arguing that if scientific and technical information
needs to be restricted, it should be classified.
This report traces the evolution of SBU-related controls; summarizes actions
taken to protect certain types of scientific and technical information; describes
critiques of some control policies; and summarizes proposals and actions, including
congressional, executive and other initiatives, to clarify these issues and develop
policies that serve various stakeholders.  It also raises  issues that may warrant further
attention.4 
Summary of Federal Policies to Classify or Control
Scientific and Technical Information 
Generally, pursuant to National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189),
fundamental (basic or applied) research conducted in universities is not to be labeled
“classified” if does not affect national security; it is therefore “unrestricted.”5
Nevertheless, as one commentator noted, “[T]he federal government seems to
CRS-3
6 Alexander J. Breeding, Sensitive But Unclassified Information: A Threat to Physical
Security, SANS Institute, 2003, p. 24.
7 Executive Order 12958, Apr. 17, 1995 (Federal Register, 60 FR 19825), permitted
classification of “scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national
security” (Sec. 1.5).  But Section 1.8 (b) prohibited classification of “basic scientific
research information not related to the national security.”  Executive Order 13292, Mar. 25,
2003, changed section 1.5 of Executive Order 12958 to permit classification of “scientific,
technological, or economic matters relating to the national security, which includes defense
against transnational terrorism” (Sec. 1.4 (e) of Executive Order 13292, Federal Register,
Mar. 25, 2003).  The amendment also added a new category of information, concerning
“weapons of mass destruction,” which may be classified (Sec. 1.4 (h)). The exemption for
basic scientific research not clearly related to national security remains (new Section 1.7).
8 “Order of December 10, 2001 — Designation Under Executive Order 12958, Federal
Register, Dec. 12, 2001, Vol. 66, No. 239, pp. 64345-64347.
9 “Order of September 26, 2002 — Designation Under Executive Order 12958,” Federal
Register, Sept. 30, 2002, Vol. 67, No. 189, pp. 61463-61465.
10 “Order of May 6, 2002 — Designation Under Executive Order 12958,” Federal Register,
May 9, 2002, Vol. 67, No. 90, p. 31109. 
11 “Order of September 17, 2003 — Designation Under Executive Order 12958,” Federal
Register, Sept. 17, 2003, Vol. 68, No. 184, p. 55257.
12 “Most government grants for unclassified technical activity specify that if the grantee
believes the results of the work warrant classification, the grantee has the responsibility to
limit the dissemination of that work and to contact the appropriate U.S. government agency
with the authority to classify it.  In such extraordinary cases, the initiative to seek
classification rests with the grantee, not the government” (Security Controls on Scientific
Information and the Conduct of Scientific Research: A White Paper of the Commission on
Scientific Communication and National Security, Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic
and International Studies, June 2005, pp. 5-6).  For instance, according to section 850 of the
current version of the NSF Grant Policy Manual, NSF-02-151, July 2002, “Some basic
(continued...)
possess wide latitude in declaring information, even purely scientific research,
classified or at least sensitive to prevent publication.”6 
Policies for Classification of Research Information
If research does compromise national security, it may be classified pursuant to
Executive Order 12958 and Executive Order 13292 — the latter of which expanded
the government’s ability to classify some scientific and technical information to
include information related to “defense against transnational terrorism” (Section 1.4
of Executive Order 13292).7  During 2001 and 2002, the heads of several federal
agencies with substantial research responsibilities, who did not have classification
authority under Executive Order 12958, were given original classification authority.
These included the Secretaries of Health and Human Services8 and of Agriculture,9
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,10 and the Director of the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).11  Also, pursuant to
Executive Order 12958, federally funded researchers at any research-performing
institution, including universities and colleges, are obligated to report to the
government information that they produce that should be classified.12 In addition, the
CRS-4
12 (...continued)
research information concerning, among other things, scientific, technological or economic
matters relating to the national security or cryptology may require classification.  There may
be cases when an NSF grantee originates information during the course of an NSF-supported
project that the grantee believes requires classification under E.O. 12958.  In such a case,
the grantee has the responsibility to promptly 1. Submit the information directly to the
government agency with appropriate subject matter interest and classification authority or,
if uncertain as to which agency should receive the information, to the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office, GSA;  2. Protect the information as though it were
classified until the grantee is informed that the information does not require classification,
but not longer than 30 days after receipt by the agency with subject matter interest or by the
GSA; and 3. Notify the appropriate NSF program Officer.” The authority has to decide
within 30 days whether to classify the information, and if it requires classification, the
“performing organization may wish or need to discontinue the project.”  Dissemination of
findings may also be controlled. 
13 The federal government exercises “prepublication review” of some privately published
scientific and technical information by current and former employees and contractors who
worked for federal agencies and who had access to classified information. The Defense
Department (DOD) typically includes “prepublication review” clauses in government
contracts for extramural research.  These controls are used if classified information was used
in research or when the government seeks to prohibit release of information deemed
sensitive because of the way it is aggregated.  Beginning in 1980, all academic cryptography
research is to be submitted on a voluntary basis for pre-publication review to the National
Security Agency.  The U.S. government may enter into contracts to purchase exclusive
rights to commercial satellite imagery and may stop the collection and dissemination of
commercial satellite imagery for national security reasons. (For additional information, see
CRS Report RL31845, op. cit. and CSIS, Security Controls on Scientific Information, June
2005, op. cit., pp. 13-14.)
14 See CRS Report RL31845, op. cit.
15 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 181-188.  See CRS Report RL31845 for additional information.
According to OMBWatch’s report, Secrecy Report Card 2005: Quantitative Indicators of
Secrecy in the Federal Government, a report by Open the Government.Org. Americans for
Less Secrecy, More Democracy, Washington, D.C., 2005, the number of secrecy orders
imposed on new patents rose from 83 in 2001 to 124 in 2004, and the number of secrecy
orders in effect increased from 4,736 in 2001 to 4,885 in 2004 (p. 5) However, it is likely
that most of these were recommended by, and issued to, federal agencies for their own
government-owned technical information.
government may exercise prepublication reviews on some R&D information,13 and
by writing into contracts control clauses for SBU or classified information.  Some
R&D information is “born classified,” according to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.14
In addition, pursuant to the Information Security Act of 1951, certain patent
information may be classified if release would harm national security.15  
Controls on Nonclassified Academic and Industrial Research
Academic and industrial researchers are also subject to sensitive information
controls for nonclassified information.  For instance, the issue of federal agency
research contracts with universities imposing prepublication review clauses was
addressed in an April 2004 report, Restrictions on Research Awards: Troublesome
Clauses, released by the Association of American Universities, in cooperation with
CRS-5
16 Both the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2401-2420) (6) and the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751-2794) provide authority to control the dissemination to foreign
nationals, both in the United States and abroad, of scientific and technical data related to
items requiring export licenses according to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
or the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  Both laws give agencies authority
to regulate the export of technical data.  ITAR controls the release of defense articles
specified on the U.S. Munitions List (22 CFR 121) and technical data directly related to
them.  EAR, among other things, controls the export of dual-use items (items that have both
civilian and military uses) on the Department of Commerce Control List (15 CFR Part 774)
and technical data related to them.  The implementing regulations are administered by the
Department of Commerce, which licenses items subject to EAR, and by the Department of
State, which licenses items subject to ITAR and the Munitions List of items.  Fundamental
research, but not all activities related to the conduct of such research, is excluded from
ITAR and EAR.  ITAR generally treats the disclosure or transfer of technical data to a
foreign national, whether in the United States or abroad, as an export.  According to ITAR
regulations, publicly available scientific and technical information and academic exchanges
and information presented at scientific meetings are not treated as controlled technical data.
Nevertheless, there has been considerable ambiguity and confusion regarding these
provisions because of uncertainties about which research projects might not be excluded
because they use space or defense articles, technologies, and defense services on the
Munitions List that is used to identify technologies requiring export licensing.  The Export
Administration regulations categorize as “deemed exports” communications both to foreign
nationals about technologies characterized as “sensitive” and to countries identified as
“sensitive” under EAR rules.  Under language in a rule issued in March 2002, the State
Department exempted U.S. universities from obtaining ITAR licenses for export of certain
space-based fundamental research information or articles in the public domain to certain
universities and research centers in countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the European Union, and the European Space Agency, or to major
non-NATO allies, such as Japan and Israel.  Also to be permitted are exports of certain
services and unclassified technical data for assembly of products into scientific, research,
or experimental satellites.  In addition, collaborators in approved countries would have to
guarantee that researchers from non-approved countries were not receiving restricted
information.  (For sources and additional information, see CRS Report RL31845, op. cit.)
17 “Controls on ‘Deemed Export’ May Threaten Research,” Secrecy News, May 2, 2005. 
the Council on Government Relations.  It detailed 138 instances of restrictions placed
on publications or other prohibitions on foreign nationals as preconditions for
receiving research awards.  The report opposed the practice, recommended that
federal agencies adhere to the mandates of NSDD-189, and concluded that
governmental restrictions were not compatible with university research.
Export and Visa Controls.  Export control regulations generally do not
apply to the conduct of fundamental research as long as it is ordinarily published and
shared broadly within the scientific community.  However, export control regulations
and International Traffic in Arms Control regulations (ITAR) permit the government
to require licensing for the export, or “deemed export,” of certain scientific and
technical information to specific foreign countries or citizens of those countries
working in the United States16 on university campuses or in industrial laboratories.
During 2004 and 2005, considerable controversy arose17 over the publication of two
CRS-6
18 U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Inspector General, Bureau of Industry and
Security, Deemed Export Controls May Not Stop the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to
Foreign Nationals in the U.S., Final Inspection Report No. OPE-16176, March 2004, 54 p.
Interagency Review of Foreign Nationals Access to Export-Controlled Technology in the
United States, Vol. 1, April 2004, Report D-20004-062, 33 p.
19 “Revision and Clarification of Deemed Export Related Regulatory
Requirements,”Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Register, Mar. 28, 2005,
vol. 70, no. 58, pp. 15607-15609.
20 Statement of Peter Lichtenbaum, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Adminstration at a conference at the National Academies at which the author of this report
was present.  See also Kelly Field, Commerce Department Will Drop Some But Not All
Restrictions on Foreign Researchers, Colleges Are Told, Chronicle of Higher Education,
Jan. 17, 2006.  
21 “Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Export-Controlled Information and
Technology, Proposed Rule With Request for Comments, Federal Register, July 12, 2005,
vol. 70, no. 132, p. 39977.
22 Security Controls on Scientific Information, June 2005, op. cit., p. 7.
23 For instance, see rationale detailed in CSIS, Security Controls on Scientific Information,
June 2005, op. cit. pp. 9-12, and American Civil Liberties Union, Science Under Siege: The
Bush Administration’s Assault on Academic Freedom and Scientific Inquiry, Written by
Tania Simoncelli with Jay Stanley, June 2005, 35 p., which also summarizes reports and the
views of the academic community, pp. 9-13.
Inspector General reports,18 one from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
other from the Department of Commerce (DOC).  They proposed strict adherence to
government interpretations that, even if the research being conducted is fundamental,
the operation, technical training, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, or
refurbishing of commercially available equipment used in the research is a “deemed
export” that requires an export license for certain foreign researchers.  This would be
for equipment as common as fermenters and global positioning system (GPS)
locators and would apply to students from China, Russia, India, and other countries
on lists of countries that pose national security threats.  In a notice of a proposed rule
published in the Federal Register on March 28, 2005,19 the DOC recommended that
country of birth rather than of citizenship or permanent residence be used as the
criterion for determining nationality for deemed export controls.  Subsequently, in
January 2006, a DOC spokesman said that because of comments received on the
proposed rule, DOC would base controls not on country of birth, but on a foreign
national’s most recent country of citizenship or permanent residency.20 DOD’s
proposed rules were published in July 2005.21  Final rules are pending as of the
publication date of this report. 
Some university officials argue that expanded interpretations of rules for
“deemed export” licenses may be unnecessary.22 Other members of the academic
community cite problems in administering use controls, including ambiguity about
identifying which equipment or material in university laboratories is subject to export
controls; discrimination on the basis of nationality; difficulty in controlling access of
students and researchers in university laboratories; time required to obtain licenses
and inflexibility in obtaining licenses;23 modest security benefits; slowing or
preventing important discoveries due to licensing delays; loss of research talent if
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24 CSIS, Security Controls on Scientific Information, June 2005, op. cit , p. 12. 
25  The National Academies, Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing
America for a Brighter Economic Future, Executive Summary, 2005, p. 6.  See also reports
of NAS workshops in May and Sept. 2005, Eugene Russo, “DoD Export Controls Rule
Should Not Apply to Fundamental Research, Officials Say,” Research Policy Alert, Sept.
23, 2005; “National Academies, Societies Criticize on DoD’s Proposed Export Control
Rule,” Research Policy Alert, Oct. 18, 2005. 
26 Danielle Belopotosky, “Techies Challenge Planned Changes On ‘Deemed Exports,’”
Technology Daily, June 24, 2005.
27 Scott Shane. “Universities Say New Rules Could Hurt U.S. Research,” New York Times,
Nov. 26, 2005. 
28 Science Under Siege, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
students and researchers study in other countries; and reduction in research at the
leading edge of science.  
The three presidents of the National Academies [of Science, Engineering, and
the Institute of Medicine] opposed such controls in a letter to DOC Secretary Carlos
M. Guitierrez, June 16, 2005, and made several recommendations, including the
proposal to “[c]lear international students and postdoctoral fellows for access to
controlled equipment when their visas are issued or shortly thereafter so that their
admission to a university academic program is coupled with their access to use of
export controlled equipment.”  One policy group recommended an alternative
approach: to require a deemed export license for “transfers of technology to
specifically identified individuals if specific adverse information exists about that
individual.”24  In a 2005 report prepared at congressional request, a National
Academies panel recommended providing all foreign students and researchers
engaged in fundamental research with access comparable to that provided to U.S.
citizens and permanent residents and to remove “... all technology items (information
and equipment) from the deemed-export technology lists that are available for
purchase on the overseas open market from foreign or US companies or that have
manuals that are available in the public domain, in libraries, over the Internet, or from
manufacturers.”25  The National Foreign Trade Council and other related technology
groups also have opposed these rules.26  Others charge universities would have to pay
“... millions of dollars to inventory sensitive equipment, determine students’
birthplaces and study which foreigners were using which machines.”27
As for other controls to deter terrorism, more governmental scrutiny has been
used to review and issue visas for foreign researchers and students, and more items
have been placed on the Technology Alert List (TAL), which is now classified.  The
State Department uses the TAL to identify academic and technical subjects that are
viewed as sensitive; foreign students proposing to study these subject undergo extra
visa scrutiny under the Visas Mantis program.28  The State Department also has
tightened entry/exit registration of foreign students and scholars and tracks their
activities in an effort to deter terrorism.  These actions may have prohibited the entry
of potential terrorists, but some critics allege that they have reduced the number of
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Sept./Oct. 2004.  See also: U.S. GAO, Border Security: Streamlined Visas Mantis Program
Has Lowered Burden on Foreign Science Students and Scholars, but Further Refinements
Needed, GAO-05-198, Feb. 2005.
30 Science Under Siege, op. cit., pp. 16-20 and Alison Abbott, “Europe Revamps Visa Rules
to Attract World’s Best Minds,” Nature, Oct. 27, 2005.  See also American Association of
University Professors, Report by Special Committee on Academic Freedom and National
Security in a Time of Crisis, Nov./Dec. 2003.
31 One that did not is the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. See Yudhijit
Bhattacharjee, “Society Bars Papers From Iranian Authors,” Science, June 17, 2005. 
32 Science Under Siege, op. cit., pp. 10-11, and Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, “Scientific
Publishing: Editing No Longer Infringes U.S. Trade Sanctions,” Science, Dec. 24, 2004.
33 Interview with CRS specialist Harold Relyea, December 2005.
34 101 Stat. 1724-1730, 40 U.S.C 1441.
35 5 U.S.C. 552, as amended by P.L. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048.
36 The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. Section 552a , as amended.
foreign students studying in the United States29 and increased the number of foreign
students studying in other countries.30
In 2004, the federal government proposed rules declaring that American
scientists could not collaborate with, and American publishers could not edit works
authored by, scientists in nations that are targets of trade embargoes, including Iran,
Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea.  Most scientific societies opposed these
proposals31 on the grounds that they reduced the intellectual freedom of those in other
countries and hampered international science. Subsequently, the administering
agency, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC),
decided to permit editing and peer review, but continued to prohibit collaboration
between U.S. scholars and researchers in a sanctioned country.32
Policies To Control SBU Information
The history through 2002 of using the label SBU was described in detail in CRS
Report RL31845 and is summarized briefly in this section, which also updates action
through February 15, 2006.  
Introduction to the Term “SBU”
Federal agencies began to use the term “SBU” in the 1970s,33 but the term has
never been defined in statutory law.  Starting in 1987 and continuing today, when
using the term “sensitive information,” some agencies refer to the definition for
sensitive information that was used in the Computer Security Act of 1987, P.L. 100-
235,34 and to information exempt from disclosure in the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)35 and the Privacy Act, as amended.36
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Computer Security Act Definition of “Sensitive”
The Computer Security Act of 1987 (CSA) was intended to protect the security
and privacy of sensitive unclassified information in federal computer systems and the
systems themselves.  P.L. 100-235 defined the term “sensitive” information as
any information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of
which could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of Federal
programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under section 552a of
title 5, United States Code (the Privacy Act), but which has not been specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order or an Act of Congress
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy” (Section 3).
Because P.L. 100-235 applied to “sensitive information” that was not classified,
some say it defined “sensitive but unclassified.”  Pursuant to the CSA, federal
agencies were responsible for protecting such “sensitive” information and for
developing plans to secure it “commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm
resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of the
information being protected.”37  The CSA, among other things, required agencies to
develop security plans for systems containing sensitive information. It authorized the
National Bureau of Standards (NBS), now called the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), to create a security-oriented standards program. The
definition of “sensitive information” was placed within the section that listed NBS’s
functions, and subsequently NIST became responsible when the agency’s name was
changed in 1988.  In 1992, NIST issued guidance giving agencies authority to
implement risk-based procedures to protect sensitive information pursuant to P.L.
100-235.  NIST reiterated that “[i]nterpretation of the CSA’s definition of sensitive
is, ultimately, an agency responsibility.”  It identified three security goals: 
Typically, protecting sensitive information means providing for one or more of
the following: Confidentiality: disclosure of the information must be restricted
to designated parties; Integrity: The information must be protected from errors
or  unauthorized modification; Availability: The information must be available
within some given time frame (i.e., protected against destruction).”38[Emphasis
added.]  
Although it was not mandatory, NIST urged agency information owners to use a risk-
based approach to identify information to be protected and controls needed based on
risk of loss:  
The type and amount of protection needed depends on the nature of the
information and the environment in which it is processed.  The controls to be
used will depend on the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from the loss,
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41 According to P.L. 100-235, “Sec. 8. ... Nothing in this Act, or in any amendment made by
this Act, shall be construed (1) to constitute authority to withhold information sought
pursuant to Section 552 of title 5, United States Code; or (2) to authorize any Federal agency
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title 5, United States Code, or other law requiring or authorizing the public disclosure of
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42 The report accompanying the legislation said specifically, “The designation of information
as sensitive [or as subject to protection] under the Computer Security Act is not a
determination that the information is not subject to public disclosure” (House Report 100-
153, Part I, June 11, 1987).
43 The guidance said, “The Computer Security Act did not alter the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA); therefore, an agency’s determination of sensitivity under this definition does
not change the status of releaseability under the FOIA”  (“Advising Users on Computer
System Technology,” op. cit.)
misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of the information contained
in the system.39
SBU in Relation to the Freedom of Information Act
Predating the CSA, the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA) was
enacted to ensure public access to certain types of information held by federal
agencies.  However, it permits agencies to exempt from public disclosure nine types
of information: 
(1) information classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, 
(2) internal personnel rules and practices of an agency, 
(3) information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, 
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential, 
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters reflecting predecisional
attitudes, 
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,
(7) specified types of law enforcement records or information, 
(8) financial institution regulation or supervision reports, and
(9) geological and geophysical information and data concerning wells.40 
The CSA,41 the report accompanying it,42 and NIST guidance43 included explicit
instructions that categorizing information as “sensitive” did not confer authority to
withhold information sought pursuant to Section 552 of Title 5, United States Code
[the Freedom of Information Act].  Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, some
federal agencies say that all information categorized as For Official Use Only
(FOUO) or in related categories is SBU, or that all SBU information may be withheld
under FOIA. 
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45 The White House memo, signed by Chief of Staff Andrew Card, entitled “Action to
Safeguard Information Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and other Sensitive
Documents Related to Homeland Security,” Mar. 19, 2002, required agencies to examine
their policies and holdings in accord with accompanying memos issued by the National
Archives and Records Administration’s (NARA) Information Security Oversight Office
(ISOO) and the Department of Justice’s Office of Information and Privacy (OIP).  The
purpose was to determine if information should be classified or handled as sensitive but
unclassified information that could be “misused to harm the security of our Nation and the
safety of our people” and report their review to the White House.  The accompanying memo
included a section titled “sensitive but unclassified information,”which instructed agencies
to consider all applicable FOIA exemptions before releasing “sensitive information related
to America’s homeland security”(SHSI) (“Safeguarding Information Regarding Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Other Sensitive Records Related to Homeland Security,”
Memorandum for Departments and Agencies, from Laura L.S. Kimberly, ISOO, NARA, and
Richard L. Huff, and Daniel J. Metcalfe, OIP, Dept. of Justice, “Safeguarding Information
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Sensitive Records Related to Homeland
Security,” Mar. 19, 2002).  Agencies were referred to guidance that had been issued by
Attorney General Ashcroft in Oct. 2001 that instructed agencies, when undertaking
discretionary disclosure determinations under FOIA (agencies can make their own
discretionary decisions about whether to disclose information even if it falls within one of
the nine FOIA exemption categories) to consider using broad interpretations of the FOIA
exemptions because of the need for heightened security in the wake of the 9/11 attacks
(“New Attorney General FOIA Memorandum Issued,” FOIA Post, Oct. 15, 2001, including
“Memorandum for Heads of all Federal Departments and Agencies, From: John Ashcroft,
Attorney General, Subject: The Freedom of Information Act, Oct. 15, 2001”).  The memo
instructed agencies to interpret FOIA exemption two broadly to permit withholding of a
document that if released would allow circumvention of an agency rule, policy or statute,
thereby impeding the agency in the conduct of its mission. (See U.S. Department of Justice,
Freedom of Information Act Guide and Privacy Act Overview, May 2002, ed., pp. 16-17,
124-127 and CRS Report RL31547, Critical Infrastructure Information Disclosure and
Homeland Security, by John D. Moteff and Gina Marie Stevens.)  In the predecessor
memorandum issued by Attorney General Janet Reno in 1993, agencies were encouraged
to release documents, even if the law provided a way to withhold information, if there was
no “foreseeable harm” from doing do. 
In 2002 and 2003, the House oversight committee on FOIA, the Committee on
Government Reform, called the Attorney General’s October 2001 memorandum into
question and specifically rejected its standard to allow the withholding of information
sought under FOIA whenever there is merely a “sound legal basis” for doing so.  The
(continued...)
Department of Justice Broadens Interpretation of Exemptions From
FOIA in 2003 and 2004.44  After the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the White
House and the Department of Justice, in a series of administrative actions, expanded
agencies’ ability to withhold SBU information.  To prevent potential use of sensitive
information by terrorists, in March 2002, the White House issued the so-called “Card
memo,” which required agencies to examine their information holdings and policies;
withhold information, including “sensitive but unclassified” information; and use
FOIA exemptions if there was a sound legal basis to do so.  Attorney General John
Ashcroft’s prior memorandum of October 2001 on this issue was referenced.  These
statements modified the previous Administration’s policy, which urged agencies to
release information if there was no “foreseeable harm” in doing so.45
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committee directed agencies to withhold documents only in those cases when the agency
reasonably foresees that disclosure would be harmful to an interest protected by an
exemption (A Citizen’s Guide on Using the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act
of 1974 to Request Government Records, 107th Cong., 2nd sess. H.Rept. 107-371, 2002, p.
3; and in a report with the same title, 108th Congress, 1st sess., 2003, H.Rept. 108-172).
46 On June 25, 2003 officials from the DOJ’s Office of Information and Privacy and from
the National Security Council held a closed conference that was summarized on the DOJ
website. (U.S. Department of Justice,”FOIA Officers Conference Held on Homeland
Security,” FOIA Post, July 3, 2003 [http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/
2003foiapost25.htm]).  Among other things, it reviewed several court cases in 2003 that
allowed agencies to use national security considerations, other than those defined in FOIA
exemption 1, to withhold information of possible use  to terrorists.  These included one that
allowed the U.S. Customs Service to use exemption 2 to deny information on inspections
of seaport operations (Coastal Delivery Corp. v. U.S. Customs Service, decided Mar.17,
2003, by the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles), and another to allow withholding under
exemption 7 (e) of “inundation maps”that had been compiled as law enforcement records
and showed flood area below Hoover and Glen Canyon dams (Living Rivers, Inc., v. the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, Mar. 25, 2003. by the U.S. District Court in Salt Lake City). 
47 FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition, Exemption one, [http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foi-act.htm].
Subsequently in 2003, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued guidance based
on court decisions that broadened interpretation of exemptions from disclosure under
FOIA.46  It also discussed the new exemption three provision of P.L. 107-296, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, which protects voluntarily submitted critical
infrastructure information.  The Freedom of Information Act Guide, 2004, explained
how an agency’s ability to restrict the release of “sensitive” information via FOIA
would be broadened; and, citing the September 11, 2001, attacks, the passage of P.L.
107-296, and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), cautioned
vigilance on releasing “sensitive” information: 
These changes have greatly impacted many aspects of the operation of the
federal government, including the administration of the FOIA.  Much greater
emphasis is now placed on the protection of information that could expose the
nation’s critical infrastructure, military, government, and citizenry to an
increased risk of attack.  As a result of these changes, federal departments and
agencies should carefully consider the sensitivity of any information the
disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause national security
harm.47 
The Guide reiterated, however, that use of labels such as SBU. SHSI, and so
forth does not “provide for any protection from disclosure under any [FOIA]
exemption ...” [except for critical infrastructure information (CII), which is protected
by statute].  Nevertheless, the Guide encouraged agencies to exempt from disclosure
information labeled “SHSI” or other nonclassified information that is highly
sensitive, as referenced in the aforementioned court decisions and in Homeland
Security Presidential Directive HSPD-7, issued on December 22, 2003:
[W]hatever the safeguarding label that an agency might (or might not) use for the
information maintained by it that has special sensitivity — e.g., “for official use
only” (FOUO), “restricted data” (a Department of Energy designation), or
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108-177, Section 316, 117 Stat. 2599, 2610-11 (2003).  This section mandates that DHS
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51 Executive Order 13311, Federal Register, July 29, 2003, pp. 45149-45150.  The President
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52 Report Pursuant to Section 893, not dated but reportedly sent to the committee chairmen
in February 2004, op. cit. 
53 U.S. Department of Justice,” FOIA Officers Conference Held on Homeland Security,”
FOIA Post, July 3, 2003, [http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2003foiapost25.htm].
“sensitive homeland security information” (SHSI) — whenever predominantly
internal agency records may reveal information the disclosure of which could
reasonably be expected to cause any of the harms described above [to critical
systems, facilities, stockpiles, and other assets], responsible federal officials
should carefully consider the propriety of protecting such information under
Exemption 2.48
SBU Information Policies in the Homeland Security Act, P.L.
107-296, and Subsequent Presidential Action
The Homeland Security Act, P.L. 107-296, signed on November 25, 2002,
defined homeland security information as “any information possessed by a Federal,
State or local agency that (A) relates to the threat of terrorist activity; (B) relates to
the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity; (C) would improve the
identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or (D)
would improve the response to a terrorist act.”49  The law, among other things,
required agencies to develop information-sharing systems to transmit classified or
unclassified information and to share it with appropriate recipients, including those
at the state and local levels.  It also recognized the use of nondisclosure agreements
for sharing sensitive but unclassified information with state and local personnel.
Section 892, as amended,50 required the President to “prescribe and implement
procedures” for federal agencies to “identify and safeguard sensitive homeland
security information that is sensitive but unclassified,” [now abbreviated SHSI] and
to prescribe procedures to share this information with other federal agencies and
appropriate state and local personnel (required by section 892 (a) (1) (A)(B) of P.L.
107-296).  In Executive Order 13311, July 29, 2003, the President transferred some
of these functions to the Department of Homeland Security Secretary, to be carried
out in consultation with other governmental officials.51  The President is still
mandated to prescribe procedures for federal agencies.  Section 893 of the law had
required the President to report to specified congressional committees about
implementation of section 892 and any recommendations for additional measures to
“increase the effectiveness of sharing of information between and among Federal,
State, and local entities.”  According to that report52 and other documents,53 in 2004,
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DHS was preparing the guidance to identify and protect sensitive but unclassified
SHSI.  In its report to Congress, DHS wrote that the procedures it was developing
will provide guidance on identifying SHSI by defining SHSI, establishing
uniform procedures for identifying and marking SHSI, and delineating entities
with which it may be properly shared.  The procedures will aid in safeguarding
SHSI by establishing uniform minimum standards for the secure handling of
sensitive information designated as SHSI, in a manner consistent with existing
law.  Lastly, the procedures will help to facilitate the sharing of SHSI with
appropriate Federal, state and local users, while also protecting it from
unwarranted public disclosure that could result in reduction of the ability of
Federal, State, and local authorities to protect against threats to our homeland
security.54
The referenced guidance had not been issued as of February 15, 2006, but reportedly
will be sent to the Office of Management and Budget for release and a period of
public comment.55 
In a related development, on December 16, 2005, the President issued a
memorandum to federal agencies, “Guidelines and Requirements in Support of the
Information Sharing Environment,” that included requiring agencies to standardize
procedures “for designating, marking, and handling SBU information ... across the
Federal Government” in order to promote both appropriate,  consistent safeguarding
and sharing of information.56  Within 90 days, agencies were to inventory their SBU
information procedures, determine the authority for each entry, assess the
effectiveness of procedures, and report to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
who shall provide the results to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney
General.  Within a year, recommendations are to be submitted to the President
through the DNI and other officials for government-wide standards for SBU
information.  
Requirements To Use Mandatory Minimum NIST-
Generated Risk Standards To Protect All
Information
As noted above, the Computer Security Act of 1987 (CSA) authorized the
Department of Commerce’s NBS (and then its successor, NIST) to develop standards
and guidelines for federal agencies to protect sensitive information on federal
computer information systems.  The act defined sensitive information that was not
classified. (For a definition, see the section above entitled “Computer Security Act
Definition of Sensitive.”)  Under the CSA, agencies could obtain a waiver not to use
the standards.
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57 FISMA clarified and changed some provisions of the Government Information Security
Reform Act (GISRA), which was part of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense
Authorization Act of FY2001 (Div. A, Title X, Subtitle G, sec. 1061-1065, P.L. 106-398,
Oct. 30, 2000).  While GISRA expanded NIST’s functions regarding developing risk-based
standards, it would have sunseted in 2002 and did not, like FISMA, render moot the
definition of sensitive as used in CSA.  See U.S. Congress, House, Committee on
Government Reform, E-Government Act of 2002. House Report 107-787, Part 1, 107th
Congress, 2nd sess., Nov. 14, 2002, pp. 54-61.  Specifically, according to the report, “the
purpose of FISMA is to permanently authorize a government-wide risk-based approach to
information security by eliminating GISRA’s two-year sunset, and to further strengthen
Federal information security by requiring compliance with minimum mandatory
management controls for securing information and information systems, clarifying and
strengthening current management and reporting requirements, and strengthening the role
of National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)” (p. 54).
58 This was described in the House Committee on Government Reform report on the
amended version of the bill that was enacted, House Report 107-787, part I, op. cit.,
describing section 303 of what eventually became P.L. 107-347.
59 Section 305 of P.L. 107-347 repealed section 6 of the CSA, which required the
identification of systems containing sensitive information and the development of systems
security plans, which, according to the legislative report accompanying the bill that was
enacted, “is unnecessary given the overall scheme and specific requirements for agency risk-
based management of information and information systems supporting agency operations
and assets” (House Report 107-787, pt. 1. p. 87.  See also CRS Report RL31057, A Primer
on E-Government; Sectors, Stages, Opportunities, and Challenges of Online Governance,
Jeffrey W. Seifert). 
The CSA provisions were modified with passage of the Federal Information
Security Act of 2002, (FISMA), P.L. 107-347, December 2002.57  While CSA
required the development of standards to protect sensitive information, FISMA
required the development of standards to protect all information, and did not refer to
sensitive information when mandating development of standards.  It rewrote the
section of the NIST act that required development of standards for sensitive
information, and had used the CSA definition of “sensitive” information (15 U.S.C.
278g-3).  The law replaced aspects of the CSA, including the definition of “sensitive”
information because the definition was considered static and unresponsive to
changing information systems environments.58  FISMA also deleted specific
requirements to inventory information systems that contained sensitive information.59
These actions, in essence, rendered the definition moot.  Also, under FISMA,
agencies may no longer obtain a waiver to not use the standards developed by NIST.
Specifically, section 303 of P.L. 107-347 updated NIST’s mission in light of
new understandings relating to information security and required NIST, in
consultation with other agencies, including OMB, the National Security Agency, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the DHS, to develop risk-based
standards to categorize “the criticality and sensitivity of agency information
according to information security control objectives and across a range of risk levels”
and to develop minimum information security requirements for each information
category.  Under FISMA, the standards NIST was directed to develop and the
Secretary of Commerce to promulgate, will be issued by the Director of OMB in
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61 Specifically, Title III of FISMA requires, “(b) Minimum requirements for standards and
guidelines.  The standards and guidelines required by subsection (a) of this section shall
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information systems to be included in each such category; and (C) minimum information
security requirements for information and information systems in each such category ....”
(U.S. Code, Title 15, Chapter 7, Section 278g- 3. Computer standards program, i.e., 15
U.S.C. 278g-3).
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security.60  They are to be mandatory
minimum federal information processing standards (FIPS) that agencies and their
contractors must use to protect all nonclassified information and information systems
based on a range of risk levels.61  FISMA is silent on defining “sensitive” or the
relationship between the act and SBU or the sensitive homeland security information
referred to in section 892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296. 
FISMA also clarified management and reporting, strengthened NIST’s role and
responsibilities, and consolidated statutory information security requirements.  The
OMB is required by FISMA to authorize formally and accredit each agency’s
nonsecurity information system as established by the information security plan.
(Responsibility for certification of national security information systems is shared
between DOD and the Central Intelligence Agency.)  The three security objectives
 — confidentiality, integrity, and availability — that NIST has used in previous
guidance are to continue to guide NIST in its development of standards (116 STAT.
2947, P.L. 107-347, title III, paragraph 301), although these concepts were broadened
from the way NIST originally used them in 1992 to read: 
The term “information security” means protecting information and information
systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction in order to provide — (A) integrity, which means guarding against
improper information modification or destruction and includes ensuring
information nonrepudiation and authenticity; (B) confidentiality, which means
preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including means for
protecting personal privacy and proprietary information; and (C) availability,
which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information (Sec.
301 of P.L. 107-347).
The law also allows agencies to develop more stringent standards than those
generated by NIST, since it — 
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Oct. 26, 2005.  
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66 “... [L]ow [or limited], moderate [having a serious adverse effect], or high [severe or
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Security Division, NIST, “The New FISMA Standards and Guidelines. Changing the
Dynamic of Information Security for the Federal Government,” [2003], p. 2.  For additional
details, see NIST, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and
Information Systems, FIPS Publication 199, Dec. 2003, pp. 1-3).
67 As an example “... A power plant contains a SCADA (supervisory control and data
acquisition) system controlling the distribution of electric power for a large military
installation. The SCADA system contains both real-time sensor data and routine
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preserves the provision in current law (at 40 U.S.C 11331(c) permitting agencies
to use more stringent standards than provided by NIST-developed standards, but
only if those more stringent standards incorporate applicable mandatory NIST
requirements and are otherwise consistent with the risk management policies and
guidelines issued by OMB under 44 U.S.C. 3533.62 
NIST’s Policies, Standards, and Documents
The risk analysis procedures and information systems controls specified by
NIST have been developed iteratively, incorporating public comments since the end
of 2002, and implementation was to be mandatory (with NIST originally anticipating
publication of all documentation by the statutory deadline of December 2005, a
deadline which, it appears, was missed since publication has been delayed a few
months).63  Agencies are to use NIST’s guidance documents and risk management
procedures to categorize federal information and information systems and to
determine security protection levels for them based on level of risk.64 
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 199, Standards for Security
Categorization of Federal information and Information Systems, commonly called
FIPS 199, issued in final form in February 2004, provides a common framework,
method, and mandatory standards for agencies to use to identify information to
protect (that is not governed by national security controls) according to the potential
impact of loss.  FIPS 199 enables “... agencies to identify and prioritize their most
important information and information systems by defining the maximum impact a
break in confidentiality, integrity, or availability would have on the agency’s
operation, assets, and/or individuals.”65  It establishes a continuum of “criticality and
sensitivity” for information dependent upon agency requirements and priorities.  The
potential minimum impact value (low, moderate, or high66) on the compromise of a
security objective is the highest value (i.e., high-water mark) for security categories
for each type of information on the system.67
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administrative information. The management at the power plant determines that (I) for the
sensor data being acquired by the SCADA system, there is no potential impact from a loss
of confidentiality, a high potential impact from a loss of integrity, and a high potential
impact from a loss of availability; and (ii) for the administrative information being processed
by the system, there is a low potential impact from a loss of confidentiality, a low potential
impact from a loss of integrity, and a low potential impact from a loss of availability. The
resulting security categories, SC, of these information types are expressed as: SC sensor data
= {(confidentiality, NA),(integrity, HIGH), (availability, HIGH)}, and SC administrative
information = {(confidentiality, LOW), (integrity, LOW), (availability, LOW)}.  The
resulting security category of the information system is initially expressed as: SC SCADA
system = {(confidentiality, LOW), (integrity, HIGH), (availability, HIGH)}, representing
the high water mark or maximum potential impact values for each security objective from
the information types resident on the SCADA system. The management at the power plant
chooses to increase the potential impact from a loss of confidentiality from low to moderate
reflecting a more realistic view of the potential impact on the information system should
there be a security breach due to the unauthorized disclosure of system-level information or
processing functions.  The final security category of the information system is expressed as:
SC SCADA system = {(confidentiality, MODERATE), (integrity, HIGH), (availability,
HIGH)}.” (FIPS 199.)
68 William C. Barker, Volume 1: Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information
Systems to Security Categories, NIST Special Publication 800-60, Version 2.0, June 2004,
pp. 21-22. William C. Barker and Annabelle Lee, NIST, Information Security, Volume II:
Appendixes to Guide for Mapping Types of information and Information Systems to Security
Categories, June 2004, 295 pages. 
69 Barker, Volume 1, NIST Special Publication 800-60, June 2004, op. cit., pp. 21-22.
70 NIST Special Publication 800-60, op. cit., pp. 217-218.
71 NIST Special Publication 800-60, op. cit., pp. 154-155.
NIST Special Publication 800-60, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and
Information Systems, issued in final version in June 2004,68 is intended to help
agencies identify their information types and systems and to assign impact levels for
confidentiality, integrity, and availability for them for a range of risk levels.  The
impact levels are based on the security categorization guidelines in FIPS Publication
199.69  Special Publication 800-60 gives agencies explicit guidance on developing
impact standards for each of the three risk categories for all types of information and
information systems handled by federal agencies (based on OMB’s Federal
Enterprise Architecture Program Management Office’s publication, The Business
Reference Model Version 2.0).  Agencies are given guidance to determine impact
levels for information in fields such as public health, environmental management,
energy, and general sciences and innovation, including research and development.
Thus the high-water mark, or highest value category for security impact (and thus
minimum security categorization) for both “Scientific and Technical Research and
Innovation Information” and for “Research and Development Information,” is
moderate.70  Examples of minimum security categories for some other types of
information are environmental remediation information, moderate;71 pollution
CRS-19
72 NIST Special Publication 800-60, op. cit., p. 120.
73 NIST Special Publication 800-60, op. cit., p. 120.
74 Jackson, Oct. 26, 2005, op. cit.  As of February 15, 2006, the document is finished but is
a w a i t i n g  a p p r o v a l  b y  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  C o m m e r c e .  ( S e e
[http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert/milestone-schedule-v23.pdf].
75 Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, Recommendations of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, by Gary Stoneburner, Alice Goguen, and
Alexis Feringa, NIST, SP 800-30, July 2002.
76 NIST, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems, Special
Publication 800-53, Appendix D and Appendix F.  
77 OMB Circular A-130, Appendix III, “Security of Federal Automated Information
Resources,” to “OMB Circular A-130, Transmittal Memorandum #4, Management of
Federal Information Resources (11/28/2000),” requires agencies and their contractors to
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prevention and control, low;72 and health care services, high.73  Each explanation
describes circumstances, including homeland security and national security-related
implications, that agencies could identify to raise the threshold level of security
controls for each type of information. 
NIST’s publication Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information
Systems, Special Publication 800-53, September 2004 and February 2005, provides
interim guidance for minimum security control procedures for low, moderate, and
high impact information systems until completion and adoption of the anticipated
Minimum Security Controls for Federal Information Systems, Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 200, which may be published in early
2006.74  When agencies need to evaluate the levels of protection for information, they
are to undertake a risk assessment using threat and vulnerability analysis that
incorporates local conditions and then adjust their security controls using NIST
publication SP 800-30.75  After determining the security category, an agency
identifies the minimum information security requirements (i.e., management,
operational, and technical controls) for information and information systems in each
such category as identified in document 800-53.  NIST identified 17 types of security
control clusters to guide selection of minimum security controls (i.e., safeguards and
countermeasures) to protect information and information systems and 154 uniquely
identified controls (i.e., management, operational, and technical security controls) for
information and information systems in each category.  These include access control;
awareness and training; audit and accountability; certification, accreditation, and
security assessments; configuration management; contingency planning;
identification and authentication; incident response; maintenance; media protection;
physical and environmental protection; planning; personnel security; risk assessment;
systems and services acquisition; system and communications protection; and system
and information integrity.76  The controls an agency selects to protect information
depend upon analysis of threat, vulnerabilities, and impacts. 
A Formal Risk Analysis Process Is Not Required.  OMB’s apparent
operative guidance for information security protection, Appendix III of OMB
Circular A-130,77 cautions agencies that they do not need to conduct expensive,
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maintain programs that provide adequate security for all information collected, processed,
transmitted, stored, or disseminated in general support systems and major applications”
([http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/circulars/a130/a130appendix_iii.html]).
78 Appendix III, to OMB Circular A-130, 11/28/2000, op.cit.
79 Interviews with officials at NIST and GAO.
80 Horizontal Integration: Broader Access Models for Realizing Information Dominance is
a report prepared by the Defense Department JASON advisory group for the Under
Secretary for Defense Research and Engineering, Horizontal Integration: Broader Access
Models for Realizing Information Dominance, JASON Program Office, MITRE, JSR-04-
132, Dec. 2004, p. 1.  The report focused on the goal of enabling “information dominance
[in] warfare” and concluded that more information should flow directly to military personnel
in the field, who might not always have clearance levels required to handle classified
information or sensitive information, which is “....increasingly defined by the eye of the
beholder”(pp. 4, 24-30).  The report recommended using an information system based on
“... transactional risk — that is the chance that any given transaction will be compromised,
rather than on assigning a level of classification to a document based on the potential
damage caused by disclosure” (Shaun Waterman, “Report: Govt Secrecy Hurting War
Fighters,” UPI, Dec. 15, 2004).
formal risk analyses to fulfill these requirements.  Specifically, Appendix III to OMB
Circular A-130 says that OMB
no longer requires the preparation of formal risk analyses.  In the past, substantial
resources have been expended doing complex analyses of specific risks to
systems, with limited tangible benefit in terms of improved security for the
systems.  Rather than continue to try to precisely measure risk, security efforts
are better served by generally assessing risks and taking actions to manage them.
While formal risk analyses need not be performed, the need to determine
adequate security will require that a risk-based approach be used. This risk
assessment approach should include a consideration of the major factors in risk
management: the value of the system or application, threats, vulnerabilities, and
the effectiveness of current or proposed safeguards. Additional guidance on
effective risk assessment is available in “An Introduction to Computer Security:
The NIST Handbook” (March 16, 1995).78 
While NIST recognizes this dictum, it seems that little information is available about
how agencies make decisions to categorize information in response to NIST
standards.79  
Nongovernmental Experts’ Recommendations to Use Risk
Analysis To Identify and Control Sensitive Information 
Nongovernmental experts have recommended using various types of risk-based
processes to identify, categorize, and develop controls for sensitive information
involving science and technology, and other kinds of information control.80  For
instance, the use of risk analysis figured prominently at the November 21, 2005
meeting of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) in
discussions related to developing criteria for a code of conduct for researchers,
identification of code violations, and development of appropriate consequences.  Risk
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81 The archived webcast of the Nov. 21, 2005 meeting is available at
[http://videocast.nih.gov/ram/od112105.ram].  See also, Andrew J. Hawkins, “National
Biosecurity Panel Lays Groundwork for Identifying Dual-Use Research,” Research Policy
Alert, Nov.22, 2005; Andrew J. Hawkins, “Success of Scientist Code of Conduct Hinges On
Education, Biosecurity Board Hears,” Research Policy Alert, Nov.23, 2005; and Eugene
Russo, “Biosecurity Advisory Board Reports Lessons Learned From 1918 Flu Papers, Aims
to Improve Screening Process,” Research Policy Alert, Nov. 23, 2005. 
82 Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn, The Unintended Audience: Balancing
Openness and Secrecy: Crafting an Information Policy for the 21st Century, Center for
Public Policy an private Enterprise School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, Sept.
2004, pp. 27, 32.
83 The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and Secrecy, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
84 The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and Secrecy, op. cit., pp. 40-42.  The
following illustrations were given “[f]or potential low-impact events, the most serious
threats are those that are highly convenient and extremely low cost.... Typically, these
threats cause a high level of disruption and/or annoyance. An example of such a threat
would be contaminating food with bacteria, similar to the 1984 case where members of a
religious cult sprayed salmonella bacteria on salad bars throughout the Oregon region,
(continued...)
analysis has also figured in NSABB discussions about developing a process and time
schedule to vet and communicate dual-use research while it is being conducted and
before publication, and about determining the consequences of public release.81 (For
more information about NSABB, see in the section below entitled “National Science
Advisory Board for Biosecurity.”)  Others have also proposed using risk-based
models to handle sensitive scientific and technical information.  These are discussed
next. 
Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn proposed that criteria be developed,
and that an executive order be issued, that identifies  “controlled unclassified security
information (CUSI),” consisting of CII and SHSI, whose improper release by
government or academic/scientific institutions “... could egregiously endanger public
safety.”82  The objective “... for both government-funded and privately-funded
research is to create a culture that frowns on the research, experimentation, and
publication of CUSI, much like the culture that constrains certain experimental
techniques, such as stem-cell research, and restrains others, such as human
cloning.”83  A risk-based process called a “‘Work-Factor’ for Leveraging Dangerous
Information” — the amount of resources needed to use the information for harmful
purposes — would be used to determine risk of release: 
When information that could threaten the public safety is easily accessible —
that is, when the costs of obtaining it are low and the convenience of using it is
relatively high — this “work-factor” for leveraging potentially harmful
information provides a benchmark for determining whether information should
be controlled. While high-level descriptions of and mitigations for vulnerabilities
should be released to inform and alert the public, “push-button” or “cookbook”
instructions on how to do harm are easily identifiable and clearly should be
withheld. The amount of resources, including the number of knowledgeable
personnel, needed to exploit vulnerabilities describes a work-factor, which is a
good, practical indicator of where disclosure borders on weaponization.84  
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causing 751 cases of food poisoning....  For a potential medium-impact event, those threats
that are high in cost and low in convenience warrant the least amount of concern....
Information on agents that when directly applied to fields would decrease crop yield without
completely destroying the harvest might fall into this category. It would be difficult to
deliver such agents, and decreasing the yield for some crops in the United States might
succeed only in reducing the surplus.  Nearly all of the threats of a potential high-impact
event should be considered serious, and information related to these threats should be
controlled....  A grey area, where information would have to be carefully evaluated, forms
when costs are high and convenience is low. For example, information on how to create
vaccines for highly-communicable diseases could fall into this category, as the method for
creating vaccines now in use first increases the virulence of normal diseases and then finds
inhibitors to block or antibodies to combat the strongest variants of the diseases.  Increasing
controls significantly could slow the development of preventive measures, which, in the end,
might cause more harm than good” (The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and
Secrecy, op. cit., pp. 43-44). 
85 The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and Secrecy, op. cit.,p. ii, p. 33.
86 The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and Secrecy, op. cit., p. 33.
87 The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and Secrecy, op. cit., p. 44.
88 The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and Secrecy, op. cit., p. 45.
89 The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and Secrecy, op. cit., pp. ii-iii.
The report recommended that with respect to “public sector information,” a
policy embodying CUSI would “enable the sharing of sensitive materials between
departments and agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as with those
in the private sector with a need to know,”85 and would ensure “... that similar
information produced in different agencies is identified and protected in the same
way” and that FOIA and CUSI guidelines are not in conflict.”86  DHS, it was
recommended, should develop educational programs, government controls, and
voluntary restraints to prevent the disclosure of information that should not be
released.87  Government-defined policy controls should extend to publicly funded
private researchers and DHS, assisted by NSF and NIH and other agencies, should
issue guidance to privately funded researchers.  Professional peer reviews would be
conducted before publication of work that might meet criteria for safeguarding.
Specifically,88
[f]ederally-funded researchers should disclose potential security concerns in their
grant proposals. DHS monitored review panels will assess the security
implications of the work with potentially significant negative impact in
accordance with established guidelines. DHS should lead the effort to develop
model review policies, encouraging non-federally-funded researchers to adopt
them and to submit their work to the government-monitored review panel or an
independent, government-certified review panel. DHS should also train
publishers to conduct reviews just before research is made available to serve as
a safety net after research is already completed, and publishers should implement
a two-tiered publication scheme to restrict detailed content to premium access
where the credentials of the readers can be verified.89
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90 Brian J. Gorman, “Balancing National Security and Open Science: A Proposal for Due
Process Vetting,” Yale Journal of Law and Technology, 2005, pp. 2, 15.
91 The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and Secrecy, op. cit., pp. 39-40.  See also
J. Gaudioso and R. M. “A Conceptual Framework for Biosecurity Levels,” BTR 2004:
Unified Science and Technology for Reducing Biological Threats and Countering Terrorism
 — Proceedings, Albuquerque, NM, March 18-19, 2004, p. ii.  As an illustration:
“Restricting research and development must rely on constraining knowledge rather than
forbidding it. For example, such restrictions would control research into the engineering of
viral factors that introduce animal pathogens into humans but would not prohibit it,
categorically.  Production refers to the ways in which information can be weaponized, or
leveraged against the public.  As such, production restraints should entail issues similar to
ways of refining anthrax and ways of enriching uranium.  Although information about
weapons programs would be classified, scientific “know-how” that may be — as in the case
of bioweapons —  only one step away from implementation generally would not be
classified. Employment refers to final-stage delivery.  For example, issues of employment
may refer to detailed schematics on the briefcases used in the Tokyo sarin gas attacks or
plans for maximizing the radiological contamination from a “dirty bomb” (Gaudioso and
Salerno, op. cit., Mar. 18-19, 2004, p. 28).
Brian J. Gorman proposed a risk-based alternative approach for prepublication
peer review.  He called for a risk-based process called “Due Process Vetting System”
(DPVS) together with “... a Risk Assessment Scale [RAS] and a Least Restrictive
Classification System for the communication, assessment, and disposition of
sensitive life science research in a manner consistent with national security
interests.”90 The aforementioned reports proposed that researchers should self-
evaluate the sensitivity of their work and that self-imposed professional association
or governmental constraints, including classification, be imposed if the information
could be weaponized and if the consequences of its use were high risk, but that such
information should be communicated among those with a “need to know.”91  (This
proposal and others for institutional or governmental bodies to review and approve
biological sciences research plans or publications are discussed below in the section
“Controls on Unclassified Biological Research Information.”)
Policies To Protect Specific Types of Sensitive
Information Involving Scientific and Technical
Applications
Specific laws have been enacted and policies and procedures are in varying
stages of implementation that define and protect sensitive unclassified science- and
technology-related information in such fields as critical infrastructure, transportation,
environmental impacts, biology, geospatial data, and DHS information.  These and
criticisms that have been made about them are summarized next.  
Critical Infrastructure Information Controls
The need to protect critical infrastructure information is based on the premise
that potential terrorists should not have access to information that might expose
vulnerabilities in, or provide roadmaps to, the nation’s core physical transportation,
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92 Stephen Larsen, “Secure Sensitive Unclassified Information,” Pentagram, Nov. 28, 2003
[http://www.dcmilitary.com/army/pentagram/8_47/commentary/26442-1.html]).
93 Larsen, op. cit.
94 “Too Much Info on Websites,” SAP Info, Sept. 8, 2004.
95 Sections 211-215 of P.L. 107-296, codified as 6 U.S.C. 131-134, define the term “critical
infrastructure information” to mean information not customarily in the public domain and
related to the security of critical infrastructure or protected systems.  For rules, see 6 C.F.R.
29.1 and 6 C.F.R. 29.2.
96 For additional analysis, see CRS Report RL31547, op. cit.
97 See also “Homeland Security Law Contains New Exemption 3 Statute,” FOIA Post, Jan.
27, 2003.
water, communication, energy, and related systems, or to major buildings, bridges,
and other types of major structures.  As an example of critical infrastructure
vulnerabilities, Charlie Reeder, Interagency Operations Security Support Staff, DOD,
and part of a Pentagon group that represents the National Security Agency, Central
Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, DOD, General Services
Administration, and Department of Energy (DOE), is reported to have said that “‘...
he’s seen government Web sites include maps of installations ...  specifications of
weapons and communications systems ... and much more.  ... When we publish this
information on the Internet, we might as well fax it directly to our adversaries ...’”92
He also commented that “‘According to a message sent by Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld ... an al Qaeda training manual recovered in Afghanistan states
‘using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to
gather at least 80 percent of information about the enemy.’”  Open-source
information can be accessed through Internet sites, job announcements, budget
documents, and newsletters.93  Similarly, a survey by Computerworld noted that “the
widespread availability of sensitive information on corporate websites appears to
have been largely overlooked by IT and security managers....”94  Among the
information available on the Web are “3-D models of the exterior and limited
portions of the interior of the Citigroup headquarters building in Manhattan — one
of the sites especially named in the latest terror advisory issued by the Department
of Homeland Security,” and various similar kinds of information about the building’s
structural design weaknesses. 
In part to cope with issues like these, the “Critical Infrastructure Information Act
of 2002,” Title II of  P.L. 107-296, prohibits disclosure under FOIA of “critical
infrastructure information” (CII) relating to the security of critical infrastructure and
protected systems submitted to DHS voluntarily by private companies.95  Criminal
penalties for disclosure by employees under this statute include fines, dismissal, or
imprisonment for up to a year (Section 214).96  The statute also provides for the
preemption of state freedom of information laws regarding the public disclosure of
such information if it is shared with a state or local government official in the course
of DHS’s activities.97  The DOD issued a memo on March 25, 2003, that applied
prohibitions like those in P.L. 107-296 to critical infrastructure information
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98 Memo from H.J. McIntyre on “FOIA Requests for Critical Infrastructure Information,”
described in Steven Aftergood, “DOD on Critical Infrastructure Info,” Secrecy News, Apr.
29, 2003, and “Efforts Made to Expand Critical Infrastructure Information,” OMB Watcher,
May 5, 2002. 
99 “6 CFR Part 29, Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information; Proposed
Rule, Department of Homeland Security,” Federal Register, Apr. 15, 2003, pp.
18523-18529.  For additional information, see CRS Report RL30153, Critical
Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation, by John Moteff. 
100 The implementing regulations are contained in the Code of Federal Regulations (6 CFR
Part 29). See also Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Launches Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information Program to Enhance Homeland Security, Facilitate Information
Sharing,” Press Release, Feb. 18, 2004, and attached information sheet “Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program.”  See the Federal Register, Feb. 20, 2004, pp.
8073-8089.  Comments are posted on the DHS website.  See also Lucy A. Dalglish and
Gregg P. Leslie, Homefront Confidential: How the War on Terrorism Affects Access to
Information and the Public’s Right to Know, fifth ed., 2004, pp. 70-71.
101 Dalglish and Leslie, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
102 6 U.S.C.A. section 133. See the memo on “Critical Infrastructure Information
R e g u l a t i o n s  I s s u e d  b y  D H S , ”  F O I A  P o s t ,  F e b .  2 7 ,  2 0 0 4 ,
[http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2004foiapost6.htm], Leslie, op. cit., and CRS Report
RL30153, op. cit.
103 DHS press release, Feb. 18, 2004, op. cit.
voluntarily submitted to DOD.98  On April 15, 2003, DHS published interim rules to
implement the critical information infrastructure protection provisions of P.L. 107-
296, which would extend the rules to other agencies by requiring them to pass to
DHS similar information that they receive.99  On December 17, 2003, President Bush
issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), which among other
things, directed all federal agencies to protect voluntarily submitted information
about critical infrastructure vulnerabilities in line with Title II of P.L. 107-296. 
The DHS published an interim final rule that established the “Protected
Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program,” effective February 18, 2004, with public
comments allowed until May 20, 2004.100  It requires submitters to certify, under
penalty of fine or imprisonment, that the submitted information is not subject to
disclosure under the rules of another department, such as to meet health, safety, or
environmental regulations.  If agencies other than DHS obtain comparable
information in their normal regulatory processes, the CII restrictions do not apply; if
a company submitted information to DHS under the protected CII program that was
identical to information required by another agency, the protection afforded to the
submission to DHS would not extend to the information submitted to another agency.
This latter provision is intended to allay some of the fears that companies will submit
to DHS information they do not want to be disclosed in order to hide from the public
information about pollution, new facilities, or security gaps.101  CII information
submitted to DHS is not subject to disclosure under FOIA, under a new exemption
three category, pursuant to section 214 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002,102 if
it has not been made public previously.103  The language in P.L. 107-296 protects
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104 “Critical Infrastructure Information Regulations Issued by DHS,” op. cit. 2004.
105 Air Transportation Security Act of 1974, P.L. 93-366, Section 316, 88 Stat. 409 (1974),
as cited in CRS Report RL32664, Interstate Travel: Constitutional Challenges to the
Identification Requirement and Other Transportation Security Regulations, by Todd B.
Tatelman,
106 According to Tatelman, op. cit., codified at 14 C.F.R. § 191.1 (1997). 
107 Created pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), P.L. 107-71,
section 101 (e)(3), 115 Stat. 597, 603 (2002).
108 For detailed history of the laws and regulations that govern SSI and transportation, see
CRS Report RL32664, op. cit., and CRS Report RL32425, Sensitive Security Information
and Transportation Security: Issues and Congressional Options,Mitchel A. Sollenberger.
109 CRS Report RL32664, op. cit.
110 See also “Protection of Sensitive Security Information, Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), DHS, and Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST), DOT.”
Federal Register, May 18, 2004 (v. 69, no. 96), pp. 28066-28086. (DOT, Office of the
Secretary of Transportation, 49 CFR Part 15; Department of Homeland Security,
Transportation Security Administration, 49 CFR Part 1520.)
only CII submitted to the DHS, but the Department of Justice reports that in the
future, it may be applied to submissions made to other federal agencies.104  
Sensitive Security Information Controls: Transportation
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had been permitted since passage
of the Air Transportation Security Act of 1974105 to issue regulations to protect, and
to distribute to those with a “need to know,” sensitive civil aviation security
information that was obtained during security investigations or consisted of research
and development information that would invade privacy, would reveal a trade secret
or financial or commercial information, or would be detrimental to the safety of
persons traveling by air.  “The FAA implemented this authority by promulgating
regulations, which, among other things, established a category of information known
as Sensitive Security Information (SSI).  In 1997, the Department of Transportation
(DOT) definition of SSI included ‘records and information ... obtained or developed
during security activities or research and development activities.’”106  Subsequently,
this type of information was given a statutory basis pursuant to the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, P.L. 107-71, which created the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and prohibited disclosure of certain kinds of information
relating to transportation if the disclosure would be detrimental to the safety of
passengers in transportation.107  P.L. 107-296 expanded this coverage to include
information detrimental to the “security of transportation.”  As the FAA was moved
to the TSA, first located in the DOT and then to the DHS,108 the SSI withholding
authority appears to have been expanded to include “all transportation related
activities including air and maritime cargo, trucking and freight transport, and
pipelines.”109  On May 18, 2004, the DOT and DHS jointly promulgated revised
regulations,110 which, “adopt the Homeland Security Act language as the definition
of SSI.  In addition, the new regulations incorporate former SSI provisions, including
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113 See CRS Report RL32597, Information Sharing for Homeland Security: A Brief
Overview, by Harold C. Relyea and Jeffrey W. Seifert.
114 Secrecy in the Bush Administration, by U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
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21, 2004.
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the sixteen categories of information and records that constitute SSI.”111  SSI
information is defined by statute (49 U.S.C. section 114 (s)) and an implementing
regulation (49 C.F.R. part 1520)112 as
(1) Security programs and contingency plans ... issued, established, required,
received, or approved by DOT or DHS....  (2) Security Directives....  (3)
Information Circulars ... issued by DHS or DOT regarding a threat to aviation or
maritime transportation....  (4) Performance specifications....  (5) Vulnerability
assessments....  (6) Security inspection or investigative information....  (7) Threat
information....  (8) Security measures....  (9) Security screening information....
(10) Security training materials....  (11) Identifying information of certain
transportation security personnel....  (12) Critical aviation or maritime
infrastructure asset information....  (13) Systems security information...  (14)
Confidential business information.... (15) ... Information obtained or developed
in the conduct of research related to aviation or maritime transportation security
activities, where such research is approved, accepted, funded, recommended, or
directed by the DHS or DOT, including research results... (16) Other
information....
This information, like CII information, was also designated as exempt from
disclosure under FOIA (49 U.S.C sec 40119(b) (1)) under exemption 3, which
permits the withholding of information protected by other statutes, has use limitations
for sharing with state or local governments, and imposes criminal penalties on federal
officers or employees who disclose such information.113 
Critique of SSI Rules.  The ability of terrorists to capitalize on vulnerabilities
in the national and foreign transportation systems in this arena have been manifested
several times since 2001.  Nevertheless, some critics charge that too much
information is being withheld from public access.  Many of the criticisms of SSI rules
focus on the alleged consequences of preventing the public from accessing
information that might be used to promote safety or be used in citizen oversight.  For
instance, some aircraft personnel and consumer advocates say that TSA’s use of SSI
can “muzzle debate of security initiatives and insulate TSA from criticism.”114  The
newsletter OMBWatch reported that the TSA has denied access to information when
“reasonable access to it could improve safety conditions for communities and
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with TSA regulations to avoid flying near nuclear power plants, disagreeing with
TSA’s views that information on such sites compiled from public data by the Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association should be labeled SSI and not be made available, and
denying the District of Columbia government access to information to help them
determine if trains carrying chlorine through D.C. should be rerouted.  The Coalition
of Journalists for Open Government (CJOG), a group of journalist advocacy
organizations,116 in a filing on July 16, 2004, in response to regulations jointly filed
by the Department of Transportation and the Transportation Security
Administration,117 said 
[The] ... unrestricted use of the ... (SSI) designation ... will have a seriously
adverse impact on traditional citizen and media oversight of the governance of
our seaports, airports and transit systems....  There appear to be no limits to the
type of information that might be gathered or generated as SSI and then sealed.
Local and state officials, bound by non-disclosure agreements, may be forced to
deny access to records that state law and local ordinance require be made
available to citizens. Information needed by civic activists or organizations to
maintain oversight and challenge local officials on their management of public
facilities may be withheld, even when the information’s relevance to any possible
terrorist threat is at best tenuous. 118  
In the same document,119  the CJOG recommended that federal agencies should
preserve public access to what it calls “critical oversight information” (COI) — “any
information a citizen might use to judge whether his or her public servants are
serving well,” information “that speaks to the quality and integrity of their
performance as policy makers, managers or employees of our seaports, airports and
transit systems,” including budget information and details on revenue and spending
and information about personnel and their qualifications, training, and
performance.120
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Controls on Environmental Impact Information 
Controls on environmental impact information are premised on the need to
protect internal agency decision making procedures and to control access to
information that terrorists might use to harm critical infrastructures, deliver services,
or poison the, air, water, and so forth.  The actions discussed next represent steps that
have been taken to safeguard public access to environmental information.  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) expanded its ability to withhold
certain types of environmental impact information that previously was available to
the public pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).121  On June
14, 2004, DHS issued a directive proposing new categorical exclusions to disclosure
requirements under FOIA for assessments of environmental impacts of DHS decision
making and included component DHS agencies in the categorical exclusions
policy.122  The directive specified three levels for projects or grants that might have
environmental impacts:  “those affecting national security that are categorically
excluded from coverage under NEPA; those that require DHS agencies to conduct
environmental assessments; and those with the greatest potential to affect natural
resources and the environment, which would require more detailed environmental
impact statements.”  Specifically, EPA allows categorical exclusions for “actions that
... do not ... have significant impact on the human environment, and therefore ... do
not require an environmental assessment ... or environmental impact statement....”
(40 C.F.R. 1500-1508.)  
Some of the agencies that were transferred to DHS had previously identified
such exclusions. In addition, the directive exempted all DHS agencies
(Transportation Security Administration, Coast Guard, Border Patrol, FEMA and
others) from releasing classified, proprietary, or other information exempt from
disclosure under FOIA, and proposed to exempt critical infrastructure information,
sensitive security information, and other information described in “laws, regulations,
or Executive Orders prohibiting or limiting the release of information.”123  Some say
this could exclude from public view environmental impact statements required by
NEPA.  In its Federal Register announcement, DHS said that it would place
protected information prepared for compliance with NEPA into appendix sections
for viewing only by decision makers, but would allow the public to view nonsensitive
portions of the material.  However, it added “...if segregation would leave essentially
meaningless material, the DHS elements will withhold the entire NEPA analysis
from the public.”  The plan also would allow DHS to categorize some environmental
reviews as “sensitive security information” or “critical infrastructure information”
exempt from public disclosure.  The public comment period was for one month and
then was extended to August 16, 2004.  DHS held a meeting on October 12, 2004 to
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126 “Homeland Security Wins Power to Waive All Law,” OMB Watch, Feb, 2005.
127 Reportedly, once submitted to DHS, “information that is designated CII is not merely
exempt from public disclosure.  It can’t be disclosed to any government official except for
national security purposes. Nor can it be used in court.  That means a company could tell the
Department of Homeland Security about an eroding chemical storage tank on the bank of
a river, but DHS could not disclose that information to the public or even to the
Environmental Protection Agency.  And if there were a spill ... , the information given DHS
couldn’t be subpoenaed in a law suit.  No one knows just what that will mean in practice,
but the concern is palpable” (Pete Weitzel, “A Skip Through the Rabbit Hole,” The
American Editor [American Society of Newspaper Editors], May-June-July 2004).
Problems were reported by a community group working with the Project on
Government Oversight (POGO) “to track drinking water supplies contaminated with
perchlorate, a rocket fuel that causes developmental problems in children. After 9/11, the
Army refused to share critical information with the community groups, including maps of
drinking water test wells.  What confused community groups the most was the fact that these
maps were already shared publicly — but the Army refused to acknowledge them and
claimed they were ‘sensitive’ information not for public release.  The community group
refused to back down and is now suing the Army for information under an environmental
law that gives community groups the right to be informed about toxic chemical threats”
(“Fighting Secrecy — And Winning,” OMB Watch, Feb. 23, 2004.  For additional examples
of the issue of SBU in the environmental area, see, Richard Dahl, “Does Secrecy Equal
Security?” Environmental Health Perspectives, Feb. 2004, pp. A104-A107). See also
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discuss public comments received.124  No further publicly announced information
appears to have been released about this policy.
A 2005 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 1268), enacted as P.L. 109-13,125
exempted the DHS from certain legal requirements when physically securing U.S.
borders.  Some contend that this may enable DHS to waive environmental protection
laws, among others, relating to border security.126
Critiques of Controls on Environmental Information.  Some critics
allege that these types of policies, including SBU information control policies,
conflict with the environmental quality laws of the 1970s and the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-To- Know Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. 11049).  Critics
of regulations limiting access to some critical infrastructure information focus on
their preemption of state and local disclosure laws and the inability of citizens to
obtain information needed to ensure community safety.127  Several environmental
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5100.1, Environmental Planning Program, July 14, 2004, as cited in Secrecy in the Bush
Administration, op. cit., Sept. 14, 2004, p. 56.  See also regarding access to maps locating
perchlorate plumes, “Post 9-11 Secrecy Hits Homer in Aberdeen Maryland,” Release
prepared by the Working Group on Community Right-to-Know, Jan. 29, 2004. 
129 See, for instance, U.S. Department of Energy, Environmental Assessment For the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve West Hackberry Facility Raw Water Intake Pipeline
Replacement Cameron and Calcasieu Parishes, Louisiana, DOE/EA-1497
[http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa/ea/EA1497/EA-1497.pdf] and “NRC Censors Environmental
Impact Statement,”OMB Watch, Jan. 24, 2005.
130 Source: [http://www.eh.doe.gov/nepa/documents.html].
131 Emily Sheketoff, American Library Association, Letter “Re: Department of Homeland
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Aug. 16, 2004.
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groups have criticized controls on environmental information, including the DHS
environmental directive released on June 14, 2004.  The Natural Resources Defense
Council charged that because the agencies subsumed by DHS make environmentally
related decisions relating to oil spills, border security, flood planning, and chemical
plant security, and so forth, communities should be given an opportunity to evaluate
these decisions.128  In addition, some agencies label environmental impact statements
as SBU, saying that they should be released only to those who have a “need to
know.”  Some agencies post environmental impact materials on the Internet with
blacked-out markings for what appears to be locational or infrastructure details.129
Other agencies have published documents and put SBU information into a separate
appendix, available under controlled access.  Generally, because of “security
sensitivity,” most DOE environmental assessment documents are not available to the
public online but may be accessible via hardcopy in NEPA reading rooms if the
requestor qualifies.130
The American Library Association (ALA) proposed that, with respect to
environmental information, DHS should limit “its non-disclosure provision to
information that unambiguously qualifies for withholding under one of the
exemptions provided in the Freedom of Information Act....”131  It contended that the
provision allowing DHS to withhold “essentially meaningless” information not now
subject to exemption from disclosure should be deleted since Congress intended the
public to determine what information is meaningful in the environmental statements.
OMB Watch concurred: “There are no procedures contained in the directive for how
DHS will determine which pieces of environmental analysis to remove if it falls
within an exemption, or how it will determine if the public finds the information
meaningful.”132
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Illustration of Complexity of the Issue: the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC).  The complexity of balancing access to, and protection of,
information is illustrated by actions taken by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).  In August 2004, the agency issued a statement that “certain security
information formerly included in the Reactor Oversight Process will no longer be
publicly available.”133  Its efforts to “scrub “ its website while balancing public access
and information security generated public criticism that NRC withheld information
relevant to the safety of surrounding residents but shared such information with
power companies and industrial lobbying groups.  The NRC also allegedly threatened
criminal prosecution for persons who published critiques of two nuclear reactors in
Indian Point, New York, even though the NRC is reported to have said it could not
specify what information was compromised.134  In the fall 2004, some “... news and
watchdog organizations pointed out that some sensitive documents in the [NRC
online] library could be used by terrorists”; the NRC subsequently closed major
portions of the library and reviewed items it contained.135  
Representative Edward J. Markey, a senior minority member of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, wrote to the NRC, requesting that its inspector
general investigate the agency’s information release policies and, specifically.
concerns about the NRC “improperly restricting access to specific documents that
should be releasable from a security perspective but are nevertheless being withheld
from public release.” 136 He cited the agency’s proposals to widen its definition of
“proprietary information” to withhold more public information and to broaden
restrictions on the dissemination of sensitive information to include emergency
evacuation plans and safety analyses concerning the protection of nuclear materials;
its actions to withhold an unclassified version of an NAS report allegedly because the
NRC disagreed with its findings; and the agencies’ prohibitions on non-industry
representatives attending meetings and having information, even though industrial
representatives were given access.  In June 2005, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission announced it would restore viewing on the web to more than 70,000
documents, after reviewing them for “sensitive security information.”137 An NRC
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task force concluded that the agency could withhold information that could be
deemed useful to terrorists if the information were not already available to the public
pursuant to its new Sensitive Information Screening Project, but FOIA principles
needed to be followed to withhold information.  The task force identified the precise
kinds of information that could be withheld under the various FOIA exemptions.138
Also during this time period, the National Academies released an unclassified
version of a report, that included among its findings that the commission’s security
restrictions on the sharing of information with industry and the public negatively
affected “constructive feedback and cooperation.  The committee recommended that
the ... NRC improve the sharing of pertinent information on its security analyses of
spent fuel storage with nuclear power plants operators and system vendors. More
constructive interaction with the public and with independent analysts also could
increase confidence in ... NRC and industry decisions and their actions to reduce the
vulnerability of spent fuel storage to terrorist attacks.”139 
Controls on Unclassified Biological Research Information
Traditionally, open communication of biological information fosters the conduct
of research and development.  Also, emergency preparedness requires exchange of
information to inform local health officials “... of what agents are being studied in
their jurisdictions so they can prepare for any unlikely future events.”140  However,
some biological information and data could pose a domestic or international security
threat, which has led to federal controls.141  For instance, a 2006 National Academies
report described a variety of biotechnology agents and specific genetic advances that
could be used in research and could increase the potential for biowarfare.142  It also
inventoried some dual-use biological agents and research developments that could
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be used malevolently.  For example, “The same reverse genetic technologies that can
be used to develop new vaccines against RNA viruses could also be used to construct
modified viruses, including possibly viruses that express heterologous virulence
factors that result in more lethal disease.”143  Ominously, it observed that 
[in] the past, dual-use concerns have focused on pathogens and on the challenges
associated with controlling dangerous pathogens. As already emphasized, this
committee’s deliberations have indicated that the problem will be far broader and
more profound in the future.  For example, advances in neurobiology may make
it possible to manipulate behavior and thought processes, while gene expression
technologies just now coming to fruition will make it possible to activate
endogenous molecules in the body — with possibly wide ranging and everlasting
effects.  Advances in synthetic biology and nanotechnology will offer similar
rich opportunities for dual use.  Nanodevices that may be used to unplug blocked
arteries could instead be employed to interfere with circulatory function.
Advanced drug delivery technologies and pharmacogenomics knowledge could
be used to develop and deliver with greater efficiency new bioweapons, perhaps
even selectively targeting certain racial or ethnic groups.”144
To deal with concerns like these, some types of biological sciences information
have already been controlled and proposals have been made to develop other types
of governmental or nongovernmental systems to control access to information before
research is conducted or in the prepublication phase.  These proposals, which are
discussed next, are not without controversy. 
The federal government’s regulation requiring the registration of laboratories
that transferred certain “select agents” — organisms and toxins identified by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as potentially useful in
bioterrorist activities — began in 1996.145  Registration of laboratories that possess
such agents was mandated by P.L. 107-188, “The Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,” enacted after the 9/11 attacks.
The law requires coordination between the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to identify and regulate
the use and transfer of such agents that pose a risk to public health, crops or
livestock; registration of all facilities that use such agents; minimum safety
requirements for registered facilities; background screening of persons using such
agents; and a national database of such users.  The USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 107-56
prohibits access to select agents by certain persons, including certain immigrants, and
persons with criminal or drug use history and other factors.  Interim final regulations
implementing these laws were issued in December 2002.146 
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7 CFR Part 331 and 9 CFR Part 121.
147 Janet Coleman, “NSABB Working Groups Will Begin Discussions Soon...,” Research
Policy Alert, July 5, 2005.  
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity.  A National Academy
of Sciences (NAS) report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism:
Confronting the “Dual Use” Dilemma, published in 2004 and dubbed the “Fink”
report after the committee chairman, called for greater self-regulation by scientists,
use of institutional biosafety committees at academic and research institutions to
monitor research that could possibly aid terrorism, NIH review of certain types of
research reports before they are published, and use of screening criteria in a
prepublication review.  Regarding private scientific publishing, the Fink report
largely left it up to journal publishers to make decisions about prepublication review
procedures for articles involving biological agents.  The Fink report also urged
creation of a new federal advisory board to guide nongovernmental researchers and
to develop responsibility among scientists to control flows of biodefense information.
But it did not propose governmental control of such research.  
In March 2004, the DHHS announced its intent to create a National Science
Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which became funded in 2005.  It is
managed and staffed by the National Institutes of Health (NIH).  The NSABB is
chartered to have 25 voting nongovernmental members with a broad range of
expertise in molecular biology, microbiology, infectious diseases, biosafety, public
health, veterinary medicine, plant health, national security, biodefense, law
enforcement, scientific publishing, and related fields.  The NSABB also includes
nonvoting ex officio members from 15 federal agencies and departments.  It is
supposed to advise federal departments and agencies regarding oversight of dual-use
nonclassified biological research.  The board’s charter also includes work to develop
national policies to communicate and publish sensitive research results, a code of
conduct for life sciences researchers, training programs and materials to educate the
community about biosecurity, and strategies to foster international collaboration to
oversee dual-use life sciences research.  NIH aims to use the committee’s guidance
to develop policies to require performer institutions that it funds to use Institutional
Biosafety Committees (IBC), to educate researchers, to issue guidance, and to review
and advise on specific experiments that might be misused or pose a threat to the
public health or national security.  Policy guidance will flow from the federal board
to the institutional committees if there is uncertainty or disagreement regarding denial
of an experiment.  The NSABB met in June 2005 and November 2005; it will meet
again in 2006.  
During its first meeting, the board established five working groups to develop
criteria to identify dual-use research; criteria to communicate results of dual-use
research; a life sciences code of conduct; international perspectives on dual-use
research; and guidance on chemical synthesis of bacterial and viral genomes.147
Some discussants proposed that biologists should be licensed to conduct sensitive
biological research, that codes of conduct would need to be certified, and that
methods of assuring compliance among research institutions would need to be
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developed.148  Some contended that if the scientific community did not develop
methods of monitoring and protecting sensitive research, policy makers might
develop and try to enforce more stringent controls that ultimately might prove to be
unacceptable.149  During the November 2005 meeting, the working groups gave
progress reports and discussed developing guidelines, including the use of risk-based
procedures. 
Views on Adequacy of Biosecurity Protection Policies.  Some critics
say existing biosecurity protections are inadequate to prevent terrorists from
obtaining and using biological information and suggest that stronger measures should
be taken, such as creation of a network that interacts closely with intelligence and
military agencies to prevent misuse of biological information.150  Related to this, a
2006 National Academies report, concerned about how new developments in the life
sciences coupled with rapidly advancing fields such as nanotechnology and materials
science could prove to threatening, endorsed the free and open change of information
in the life sciences to the maximum extent possible.  However, it also recommended,
! creating statutorily an independent advisory group in the security
community  to strengthen scientific and technical expertise within
the intelligence and security communities; 
! adopting and promoting a “common culture of awareness and a
shared sense of responsibility within the global communities of life
scientists,” including development of codes of ethics; and
! establishing, “... a decentralized, globally distributed network of
informed concerned scientists who have the capacity to recognize
when knowledge or technology is being used inappropriately or with
the intent to cause harm”151 and whose interventions could take the
form of counseling or “... reporting such activity to national
authorities when its appears potentially malevolent in intent.”152 
Other shortcomings in current policy have been identified.  For instance, the
scope of the DHHS’s NSABB board has been faulted because it does not extend to
privately funded research nor harmonize international standards.153  Others criticize
the select agent rules as inadequate and say federal regulations should be expanded
to prevent unauthorized persons from possessing the DNA components of a select
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agent.154  George Church, a genetics professor at Harvard, reportedly “is organizing
a consortium of researchers and academics to push the federal government to license
anyone interested in purchasing DNA segments for agents of bioterror.”155 
Similarly, John Steinbruner and colleagues at the Center for International and
Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), in a 2005 report, advocated mandatory
licensure of researchers and institutions that conduct biodefense research.  Three
levels of independent review — at the institutional, national, and international level
 — would monitor risks and benefits of research proposals and would issue approval
or disapproval for conduct of researchers and publications.156
Nongovernmental professional groups have explored the use of codes of
conduct or self-policing policies157 for research topics and publications.  Some
publishers adopted a set of voluntary, risk-based publishing principles, called
“Statement of Scientific Publication and Security,” 2003; but this, reportedly, has
resulted in changes in only very few articles before publication.158  In June 2005, the
American Society for Microbiology drafted a code of ethics for its members and
urged them to report to “appropriate authorities” misuses of microbiology
information.159  The Interacademy Panel on International Issues, consisting of most
of the world’s national science academies, issued a set of principles that urged
scientists to take responsibility to prevent misuse of their work.160  Two researchers,
Margaret A. Somerville of McGill University and Ronald M. Atlas, President of the
American Society for Microbiology, proposed an international code of ethics to
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prevent bioterrorism.161  Adherents to the code would refuse to conduct work that
could be used in bioterrorism and would seek to restrict access of those they believe
could use information maliciously.
It was noted above in the section on “Nongovernmental Experts’
Recommendations To Use Risk Analysis To Identify and Control Sensitive
Information,” that proposals have been made to instill in researchers a culture that
discourages research that could be used malevolently, that professional peer reviews
should be conducted before publication of work that should be protected, and that the
federal government should define policy controls for these activities. In addition, J.
Gaudioso and R. M. Salerno proposed a biosecurity risk assessment process that
would restrict the use of agents that have the potential to be weaponized and that
could serve as the basis for international standards.  This process would involve using
four Biosecurity levels: low, moderate, high, and extreme risk.  The
overwhelming majority of pathogens and toxins would fall into the low-risk
category (requiring practices such as locking unattended laboratories and
maintenance of documentation of agents used), and most select agents would be
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placed in the moderate-risk category (requiring additional safeguards such as
access controls and personnel checks).  The security measures for low-and
moderate-risk categories should pose reasonable costs and largely rely on
existing biosafety measures.  Very few agents would be designated high risk
(requiring more stringent security measures and a dedicated Biosecurity officer).
Perhaps only variola major, because it is no longer found in nature would be
considered an extreme risk, requiring the most stringent protections (such as
comprehensive background investigations and an on-site guard force).  Higher
security than that currently mandated by federal regulations would only be
applied for those very few agents that represent true weapon threats.  Biosecurity
levels should be developed and vetted by experts in biological weapons,
microbiology, security, and public and agricultural health.  This would help
federal agencies apply uniform criteria to grantees and could form the basis for
standardizing biosecurity internationally.162
Brian J. Gorman proposed a risk-based alternative approach for prepublication
peer review.  He called for a risk-based process called “Due Process Vetting System”
(DPVS) together with “... a Risk Assessment Scale [RAS] and a Least Restrictive
Classification System for the communication, assessment, and disposition of
sensitive life science research in a manner consistent with national security
interests.”163  The process would be overseen by a new agency called the Biologic
Regulatory Commission, modeled after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  The
vetting process would be triggered at the request of an author or peer reviewer if an
article attained a predetermined score on the RAS set by the BRC. “The RAS surveys
opinions of informed reviewers including the author of the article, the author’s
Institutional Review Board or Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), and finally
the journal interested in publishing the article.”164  The DPVS would safeguard high-
risk articles by providing the government with a mechanism to identify “potentially
dangerous articles before they reach the presses,”165 would avoid the “deleterious
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effects of censorship,”166 and would  make articles available only to a “select
academy of biodefense researchers after the authors, the publishing journal and
others, reach a consensus with the government through cooperative vetting of the
article in question.”167  Gorman proposed expanding the academy to a qualified body
of world scientists, an approach he said is superior to the ASM model and ad hoc
approaches undertaken by the majority of U.S. biosciences journals.168 
Some scientists disagree with the types of aforementioned restrictions.  Existing
controls on “select agents,” reportedly, have caused “ ... many researchers ... to
discontinue or not pursue research on regulated biological agents, rather than
implement the new security regulations and bear the associated financial burden.
Reportedly, the CDC expected 817 entities to register under the new select agent rule.
Instead, only 323 facilities are registered with the CDC, which indicated that many
institutions have discontinued their work with select agents.”169  There are also
complaints that U.S. “select agent” rules can hinder cooperation from foreign
scientists who cannot afford security controls and that many foreign laboratories do
not meet the standards for conducting such research demanded by the U.S.
government.  As a result, foreign partners, some charge, may be forced to become
“mere sample exporters,” and criminal sanctions might be applied to the U.S. partner
in a foreign collaboration if the foreigner partner’s laboratory does not meet U.S.
research security standards.170  Complaints about the CDC’s “information security”
manual have led to concern by influenza researchers that the CDC is not releasing
databases of virus sequences and other data needed to develop flu vaccines, thereby
potentially damaging the development of public health protections.171 
In addition, at the first NSABB meeting, some members suggested that instead
of formal restrictions, ethics education for researchers would suffice to deal with
potential problems.172  Others suggest that controls on biological research information
could constrain the exchange of information needed to develop effective defenses
against dangerous pathogens.173  A National Academies’ report, Seeking Security;
Pathogens, Open Access and Genomic Data Bases, published in 2004, that had been
requested by the National Science Foundation and the Central Intelligence Agency,
concluded that there should be no change in current policies that allow scientists and
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the public unrestricted access to genome data on microbial pathogens.  Access, it
concluded,  improves the nation’s ability to fight both bioterrorism and naturally
occurring infectious diseases.174  Open access to raw sequence data is unlikely to help
bioterrorists develop weapons, and preventing distribution of such information could
hurt research to prevent bioterrorism and emerging diseases such as severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS).  Genomic information about most dangerous
pathogens is already available, it said, and if the government wants to restrict
distribution of information in the future, such information should be classified.  The
report concluded that security against bioterrorism would be achieved best by
policies that facilitate, not limit, the free flow of this information.  In May 2005, the
DHHS attempted to prevent the National Academy of Sciences from publishing an
article in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences on how the U.S. milk
supply could be tainted with botulism and control measures to prevent it.  The
Academy published it on the grounds that the benefits of publishing the paper giving
biodefense guidance outweighed any threats.175  
Other nations and international scientific groups have  addressed this issue.  For
instance, reportedly a December 13, 2004 paper issued jointly by the United
Kingdom’s Royal Society and the Wellcome Trust urged caution on government
intervention.  The joint paper said “government should ask scientific societies and
funding institutions to take more responsibility for vetting and preventing the
dissemination of risky technical details.  The paper suggested that grant review forms
could include a check box for bioterror issues to ensure that they are considered.”176
Also, at a meeting in June 2005 in Geneva, life scientists from several countries
sought to develop a code of conduct.  Biosafety in life sciences research was also a
topic of discussion at an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) International “futures” program meeting in September 2004, and the
National Academies held an International Forum on Biosecurity in Como, in March
2005 to discuss convergence on codes of conduct and oversight of biosecurity
research.177
Issues Dealing with Geospatial Information 
There is considerable controversy about providing access to certain types of
geospatial information, including satellite imagery and maps depicting ordinary
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geographic features, buildings, sensitive facilities, hazardous materials storage
facilities, and so forth.
Supporting more open access to such information, in March 2004, the RAND
Corporation released a study recommending that the federal government should not
remove geospatial information such as maps and imagery from public availability
because much of it is not current enough to meet terrorists’ needs, terrorists can
obtain such information from other sources, and the public benefits from access to
much federal geospatial information.  Instead, it recommended that the federal
government develop an analytical process to assess the potential homeland security
sensitivity of specific publicly available geospatial information using three filters:
usefulness, uniqueness, and societal benefits and costs.178  Subsequently, in June
2005, the Homeland Security Group of the Federal Geographic Data Committee, an
18-member federal interagency group that coordinates geospatial data, issued for
consideration interim179 and then final guidelines for public, private, and nonprofit
organizations that originate and publicly disseminate geospatial data.180  The
guidelines seek to balance “security risks and the benefits of geospatial data
dissemination” and suggest how organizations can use risk-based procedures to
provide access to data while protecting sensitive information.  The group observed
that safeguarding is justified only for data that contain sensitive information that is
difficult to observe and not available from open sources, that are the unique source
of the sensitive information, and for which the security risk outweighs the societal
benefit of dissemination.  Two options were offered to handle sensitive data before
public release — changing it to remove or modify the sensitive information by
summarizing it, blurring details, and so forth; or restricting the data but maintaining
it in original form and making it available to those who need it, such as first
responders.181 
Congressional action in 2004 tightened controls on some geospatial information.
Section 914 of P.L. 108-375, the Defense Authorization Act FY2005, signed on
October 28, 2004, authorized a new FOIA exemption three category permitting the
withholding from public disclosure of land remote sensing information prohibited
from sale to nongovernment or government-approved customers for reasons of
national security and under license as described by the Land Remote Sensing Policy
Act of 1992, (15 U.S.C. Section 5601 et seq.).  Such information may not be
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exempted from disclosure to Congress; information disclosed to state or local
government may not be made available to the public; and agencies are required to
protect such information from disclosure.  On November 18, 2004, the DOD’s
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA)  announced that for security reasons,
as well as for reasons of potential intellectual property rights violations for
information gathered commercially in other countries, it would “... remove its Flight
Information Publications (FLIP), Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File
(DAFIF), and related aeronautical safety of navigation digital and hardcopy
publications from public sale and distribution.”182  After the review of comments was
completed in November 2005,183 the agency implemented its plan.  However, its
rationale for removal of information focused exclusively on the intellectual property
rights issue, not the security dimensions.184
In contrast to restraining information, legislation has been introduced to expand
use and applications of federal remote sensing data.  During the 109th Congress, H.R.
426, “Remote Sensing Applications Act of 2005,” reported favorably on June 27,
2005 (House Report 109-157), would, among other things, direct the Administrator
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to establish a
program of grants for pilot projects to explore the integrated use of sources of remote
sensing and other geospatial information to address state, local, regional, and tribal
agency needs.  It requires the Administrator, when awarding grants, to give
preference to specified types of projects.  The bill did not contain language
constraining use of data. 
The Department of Homeland Security’s SBU
Directives
The DHS issued an internal management directive (MD 11042) on
“Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information” on
May 11, 2004, to safeguard SBU information within DHS.  Such information would
be labeled For Official Use Only (FOUO)185 and would be defined “to identify
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/Mgmt_NEPA_MD11042SensUnclass.pdf]).
186 In Aug. 2004, DHS promulgated requirements for its employees and contractors to sign
a nondisclosure agreement to handle and protect PCII, SSI and other “other SBU”
nonclassified information.  Among its provisions, it stated that penalties for violation could
include “administrative, disciplinary, civil, or criminal action,” and that signing the
nondisclosure agreement also allows the government “to conduct inspections, at any time
or place, for the purpose of ensuring compliance” (DHS Non-disclosure Agreement, DHS
Form 11000-6 (08-04).  Some federal employee unions criticized the requirement saying that
it duplicated regulations that protect certain types of information, (“Homeland Security,”
Washington Post, editorial, Dec. 3, 2004, p. A26), that it imposed criminal prosecution for
disclosing information that is to be made available under FOIA, that it infringed on of free-
speech rights (Eileen Sullivan, “Searchers and Gag Orders: Homeland Security’s
Unprecedented Campaign Cloaks Unclassified Info,” FederalTimes.com, Dec. 6, 2004), and
that it would allow “... officials to suppress and cover up evidence of their own misconduct
or malfeasance by stamping documents ‘for official use only....’”Sullivan, op. cit.)  It was
reported that congressional staffers had been asked,  and refused, to sign such statements on
the grounds that they need to oversee the agency (Chris Strohm, “Homeland Security
Reverses Secrecy Policy But Protests Persist,” Gov Exec.com, Jan. 12, 2005). 
187 Regulations for DHS contractors to sign nondisclosure agreements for access to sensitive
but unclassified information appear in DHS’s Supplement to the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR), sec. 3037.103-71, “Conditional Access to Sensitive But Unclassified
Information.”  It was reported that DHS required participants in an unclassifed workshop
it sponsored at Booz Allen Hamilton on “Anticipating the Unanticipated,” “to consider
novel weapons and tactics that might be employed by terrorists,” to sign a nondisclosure
agreement (Steven Aftergood, “More Non-disclosure Agreements for Unclassified Info,”
Secrecy News, Dec.1, 2004).  See also Chris Strohm, “Homeland Security Reverses Secrecy
Policy But Protests Persist,” Gov Exec.com, Jan. 12, 2005; “Homeland Security Officials
End Workers’ Pledge of Secrecy,” Technology Daily, AM Edition, Jan. 13, 2005;
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unclassified information of a sensitive nature, not otherwise categorized by statute
or regulation the unauthorized disclosure of which could adversely impact a person’s
privacy or welfare, the conduct of Federal programs, or other programs or operations
essential to the national interest.” Portions of the memorandum generated
considerable opposition because of its mandatory and punitive employee and
contractor nondisclosure requirements.  In January 2005, the controversial
requirements were replaced with requirements to educate employees in security
practices, and the document was reissued as MD 11042.1.186  Contractors are still
required to sign nondisclosure agreements, and DHS employees and contractors are
still subject to administrative or disciplinary action for violating the policies.187
The directive identified several types of control labels that could be SBU,
including FOUO, CII, and SSI and so forth and 11 types of sensitive unclassified
information that can be designated for official use only (FOUO) — a type of SBU —
by any DHS employee, consultant, or contractor.  The list includes one clearly
identifiable technology-related item, which conceivably might include the results of
DHS-sponsored or conducted scientific research and development:
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(k) Developing or current technology, the release of which could hinder the
objectives of DHS, compromise a technological advantage or countermeasure,
cause a denial of service, or provide an adversary with sufficient information to
clone, counterfeit, or circumvent a process or system.188
P.L. 107-296 specified that, if “practicable,” DHS’s research is to be
unclassified, but the Presidential signing statement may have mitigated this
provision.189  It remains to be seen how this SBU regulation will affect information
generated by DHS-funded  research and development grants and contracts, and what
the response will be of universities that conduct research for DHS under its academic
centers of excellence programs.
Access to the information covered by the DHS SBU directive is on a “need-to-
know” basis, and information can be shared with cleared homeland security
personnel at state and local levels.  The directive said the use of the FOUO
designation did not automatically exempt information from disclosure under FOIA
but “[i]nformation requested by the public under a FOIA request must still be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis.”  The information would retain the FOUO
designation until the originator or other officials determine otherwise.  Procedures
to protect and disseminate such information outside of DHS were spelled out,
including requirements for secure storage and suggestions for encrypted Internet and
telephone communications.  Some other agencies also require employees to sign
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nondisclosure agreements in order to protect SBU information.190  (See below in the
section labeled “Critique of Nondisclosure Requirements.”)
Contentious Issues, Together With Legislative
Action and Other Options
The need to balance security and access poses a dilemma for policymakers that
was captured in the text of a joint report prepared in December 2004 by the Heritage
Foundation and Center for Strategic and International Studies.  The report noted that
“[I]t is necessary to strike the right balances in sharing information with or
withholding information from the public.  Policies that are either overly neglectful
or overzealous ill serve efforts to enhance homeland security.”191  Some critics
contend that many government-instituted controls on sensitive information, or on
scientific and technical information, may be unwarranted.  For instance, OMB Watch,
an interest group newsletter that advocates more access to information, maintains an
inventory and website that lists information that federal and state agencies have
removed from public access for security reasons.192  In March 2005, Steven
Aftergood, the editor of Secrecy News, published online by the Federation of
American Scientists, catalogued information deleted, sometimes, he contends,
inappropriately, from government files or to which public access has been denied.
This information includes unclassified technical reports from the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, 30- to 50-year old historical records at the National Archives,
orbits of Earth satellites, aeronautical maps, and data previously available from the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.193  
Some of the critiques of information control policies in specific scientific and
technical arenas have already been described in this report.  In addition, a number of
criticisms have been made that cut across sensitive information controls broadly and
may influence decisions about balancing security and access to sensitive unclassified
information.  These criticisms, which are discussed next, focus on allegations that
some controls can exacerbate vulnerability or stifle scientific research and
technological innovation; vagaries in nondisclosure requirements; the relationship of
SBU to FOIA; inconsistency in agencies’ definitions of and processes to identify
SBU information; developing a standard definition of SBU information; monitoring
agency use of risk-based standards for SBU; and recommendations for better
governance of SBU information procedures.  These sections also identify legislation
that has been introduced and action Congress has taken on some of these issues. 
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Allegations That Some Controls Can Exacerbate Vulnerability
and Stifle Scientific Research and Technological Innovation
 
Sensitive information controls may protect vulnerable buildings and public
services from terrorist threats, but some critics allege that preventing access to such
information can exacerbate vulnerabilities and stifle the development of innovations
to enhance protection.  According to one critic,
A large sign in New York City, indicating the location of a natural pipeline was
taken down after a website posted a photograph of the sign.... Although federal
regulations require that the location of natural gas lines be made as obvious as
possible to the public for safety reasons, the company that owns the pipeline
asserted that local laws allowed the sign’s removal.  ... The regulations requiring
that natural gas pipelines be clearly marked were established to prevent
accidental rupture that often causes injuries an deaths to residents, contractors,
and energy responders.  Ironically, removing such information puts the public in
greater danger of lethal accidents.194
Some say that protections on information access and dissemination are
especially burdensome to scientific research and academic research and that the
scientific community’s potential to generate knowledge and innovations to assist in
combating terrorism could be compromised by overzealous information security
controls.  For instance, “[t]errorists will obtain knowledge,” one  critic emphasized.195
“Our best option is to blunt their efforts to exploit it.  Keeping scientists from sharing
information damages our ability to respond to terrorism and to natural disease, which
is more likely and just as devastating.  Our best hope to head off both threats may
well be to stay one step ahead.”196 
On October 18, 2002, the three presidents of the National Academies issued a
statement that sought to balance security and openness in disseminating scientific
information.  It summarized the policy dilemma by saying that “restrictions are
clearly needed to safeguard strategic secrets; but openness also is needed to
accelerate the progress of technical knowledge and enhance the nation’s
understanding of potential threats.”  The statement encouraged the government to
reiterate government policy that basic scientific research should not be classified, that
nonclassified research reporting should not be restricted, and that vague and poorly
defined categories of research information, such as sensitive but unclassified, should
not be used.  “The inevitable effect is to stifle scientific creativity and to weaken
national security.” The statement outlined “action points” for both government and
professional societies to consider when developing a dialogue about procedures to
safeguard scientific and technical information that could possibly be of use to
potential terrorists.  An American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report addressing
governmental restrictions on science, observed that “[t]he ‘sensitive but unclassified’
and equivalent categories that effectively bar public access to information must be
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eliminated.  All information should either be properly classified or unrestricted.”197
Similarly, the American Association of University Professors recommended, “We
should resist or seek to repeal efforts to regulate unduly, or to make secret, the results
of lawful research projects under novel uses of the “sensitive but unclassified”
rubric.”198  The National Academies held a workshop on this subject early in 2003,
in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.  Subsequently,
the CSIS and the Academies established a “Roundtable on Scientific Communication
and National Security,” a working group composed of scientific and security leaders
that will hold continuing discussions to try to develop a workable publications policy.
(For additional information, see the aforementioned CRS Report RL31845.) 
A legal author argued that including SBU information clauses in contracts is
“constitutionally suspect,” especially with regard to university-conducted research
that is supported as an essential public good.  Use of the term SBU raises “... the
possibility of government censorship of private speech ... the primary danger
addressed by the Free Speech Clause,”199 and imposes “... a prior restraint on private
speech,”200 even though there may not be enough of a threshold level of national
Security danger to overcome the right to free speech.  These considerations, 
... suggest ... that SBU secrecy controls that reach into university discourse pose
a particular danger because of the special role of the university in promoting
innovation and expression outside of government control and because, with
respect to scientific information in particular, the university has a special role in
conducting research for the purpose of expansion and dissemination of
knowledge.  Although the government shapes expression on university campuses
in many ways, the expectation is that expression not identified as the
Government’s will be unconstrained.  The special role of the university thus must
weigh in the constitutional balance.201  
According to this author, government may have a legitimate constitutional right to
protect SBU information in contracts, if there is sufficient national security reason,
if uniform definitions linked to specific levels of national security danger are used,
if there are review procedures, and if the method used to control information is the
least restrictive necessary to fulfill the government’s legitimate interests.202 
Some say that placing controls on unclassified information could negatively
affect government relations with the private sector and procurement for information
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technology and other contracts.  New ideas for information security technologies,
including hard technology, software and biotech-related products, often come from
overseas, as do bids for contracts to handle sensitive agency information.
Reportedly, foreign vendors will have trouble complying with contracts that need to
meet information security standards.  It has been reported that requests for proposals
(RFPs) coming from the Defense Security Services involving data processing for its
SBU information say that employees of potential vendors need to be U.S. citizens,
with background checks. DHS and DOT procurement rules involving sensitive
information specify background checks for prime or subcontractors and that
nondisclosure forms have to be signed.203
Critique of Nondisclosure Requirements
A number of agencies require employees, contractors, and users of sensitive
information to sign nondisclosure agreements or impose penalties for disclosing SBU
and related information.  Some critics contend that language relating to penalties is
often vague, varies from agency to agency, and that some agencies’ mandatory
nondisclosure provisions and associated penalties for disclosure might weaken
federal employee rights and whisteblower protections.  Some agencies’ policies are
illustrated in Appendix A and elsewhere in this report.  For example, nondisclosure
agreements are authorized in P.L. 107-296 relating to sharing of SHSI with state and
local government personnel (sec. 892) and for handling SSI (sec. 1601).  Section 214
of the law allows penalties consisting of imprisonment, fines, administrative
penalties or dismal from employment for employees of DOT and DHS who
inappropriately share CII information.  DHS Management Directive 11042.1
prescribes penalties consisting of administrative or disciplinary actions for DHS
employees and contractors for disclosing SBU information.  DHHS has
nondisclosure provisions and penalties for disclosure of select agent information and
other sensitive information, as does the CDC for SBU information and the USDA,
for sensitive information.  The Department of the Treasury requires that certain
bidders sign nondisclosure agreements for SBU information.204  The Department of
Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) may penalize
unauthorized release of certain types of SBU information and unclassified nuclear
information.  In addition, users of federal SBU information exchange systems are
subject to nondisclosure provisions and usually are required to have clearances to
view such information.  (For details, see Appendix B to this report.)  The General
Services Administration attaches to business solicitations detailed explanation of
how its bidding documents will be available only to authorized firms that have
completed forms allowing them access to “sensitive but unclassified” bidding
information.  Such firms need to complete a document attesting that they will
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undertake reasonable care, and limit dissemination to authorized users who have a
“need to know.”205 
Penalties for disclosing SBU information can be more punitive than for
disclosing classified information according to J. William Leonard, the director of the
Information Security Oversight Office, (ISOO) at the NARA:
For example, should a Federal employee disclose certain unclassified
information - specifically Critical Infrastructure Information - in an unauthorized
manner, that individual now is subject to criminal sanctions under Section 214(f)
of the Homeland Security Act.  At the same time, an unauthorized disclosure of
certain types of classified information by that same employee would not
necessarily be subject to criminal sanctions. The reason for such disparity is not
readily apparent.206
The Project on Government Oversight, a watchdog group, criticized the revised
DHS employee nondisclosure policy released in January 2005, saying it is “still
problematic” because DHS “... prevents employees from disclosing information that
is available to the public under the Freedom of Information Act [FOIA].”207 
Legislation Introduced Affecting Disclosure Policies.  Legislation has
been introduced which may be responsive to some of these concerns.  S. 494, “The
Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act,” which was reported without
amendment on May 25, 2005 (Senate Report 109-72), would among other things
protect any federal employee who lawfully discloses evidence of waste, abuse or
mismanagement, including disclosure of classified information if made to Members
of Congress or staff authorized to receive it.  It also would authorize the Merit
Systems Protection Board to review charges for retaliation for whistleblowing;
require all agency nondisclosure forms to contain language preserving the right of
federal employees to disclose certain information, and amend the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 to allow federal employees to disclose independently obtained critical
infrastructure information for specified whistleblower purposes.  The House version
of the “Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act,” H.R. 1317, which was
ordered to be reported amended without written report on September 29, 2005, and
related bill, H.R. 3097, would  protect any federal employee who lawfully discloses
what he or she believes is credible evidence of waste, abuse, or gross
mismanagement, without restriction as to time, place, form, motive, context, or prior
disclosure.  Exempt under H.R. 1317, would be information held by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Security
Agency.
S. 888, introduced on April 21, 2005, “Homeland Security Information
Guidance and Training Act of 2005,” and referred to the Committee on Homeland
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Security and Governmental Affairs, would require DHS, among other things, to
establish best practices for state and local governments in making determinations
about the public disclosure and sharing among emergency management personnel of
sensitive nonfederal homeland security information and to provide training based on
a best practices curriculum.  No further action has occurred.
SBU Information in Relation to FOIA
Agencies differ about whether or not SBU information is automatically exempt
from disclosure under FOIA.  This contentious policy issue has been addressed in
existing law, Department of Justice (DOJ)documents, congressional hearings, and in
statements issued by the American Bar Association, among others.  Contrasting
differences in interpretation characterize this issue.  As noted, the CSA specified it
“was not to be construed to constitute authority to withhold information sought
pursuant to the FOIA, or to authorize any federal agency to limit, restrict, regulate,
or control, among other actions, the disclosure, use, transfer, or sale of any
information disclosable under the FOIA....”208  According to the DOJ’s Freedom of
Information Act Guide, May 2004, SBU and SHSI are not to be exempt from
disclosure under FOIA, except for CII (which is protected pursuant to P.L. 107-296)
and other kinds of sensitive information protected by statute — which now includes
SSI (pursuant to P.L. 107-296), some land remote sensing geospatial information
(pursuant to P.L. 108-375), and some information controlled by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. As Relyea and Seifert conclude “[i]t seems unlikely,
however, that ‘sensitive but unclassified’ homeland security information, per se,
could be protected from disclosure pursuant to the FOIA because it does not appear
to fall clearly within any of that statute’s exemptions.”209 
Nevertheless, there is ambiguity.  For instance, as described above, the DOJ
Freedom of Information Act Guide describes broad court interpretations that may
permit justifiable withholding of sensitive information under FOIA.210  Also, the
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Administration has issued instructions to agencies to attempt to use FOIA to protect
information if release would harm homeland security.  The Card memo, discussed
earlier and which guides agencies on handling of SBU information, referred to the
Attorney General’s memo of October 2001, which instructed agencies, when making
discretionary decisions to determine if information is exempt from disclosure under
a FOIA exemption, to withhold information if it is legal to do so.  It emphasized that
agencies should to try to withhold sensitive information under FOIA to protect the
nation from terrorist threat, and said that the Department of Justice would support
agency determinations.
Agencies also differ on how requests to release information under FOIA will be
handled.   Illustrations of the variety in federal agencies’ proposed or existing policies
are given in Appendix A and are outlined here.  The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) issued proposed rules in February 2005 for “Safeguards
Information” (SGI) — unclassified sensitive information deemed too sensitive for
public release, which  it said should be withheld from public access and released only
to those with a “need to know” even though it was not classified.211  In 2005
guidance, CDC said its SBU information is information that is exempt from
disclosure under FOIA.212 This was modified in 2006 to require that if a request is
received for a document marked SBU, it should be reviewed to determine if it
qualifies for an exemption under FOIA and withholding.213 DHS’s management
directive 11042.1 on SBU said all information identified as SBU should be labeled
FOUO and would include any information that might adversely affect the national
interest or the conduct of federal programs; information so labeled and requested
under FOIA would be released only on a case-by-case basis, will not be distributed
to unauthorized persons, and should be protected and disseminated only to those with
a “need to know.”  The DHS draft directive on categorical exemptions for
environmental impact information, dated June 14, 2004, proposed exclusion for
disclosure under FOIA.  Some parts of DOD automatically exempt SBU information
from FOIA.  Thus, according to the Defense Security Service, “[t]he term sensitive
unclassified information as used here is an informal designation applicable to all
those types and forms of information that, by law or regulation, require some form
of protection but are outside the formal system for classifying national security
information.  As a general rule, all such information may be exempt from release to
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the public under the Freedom of Information Act.”214  Other parts of DOD use the
FOUO designation only for documents already exempt from FOIA.215 
DOE equates SBU and OUO, requiring that information be exempt under one
of FOIA exemptions two through nine, and exempts all SBU information, which it
calls OUO, from disclosure under FOIA, except that it says it will be made available
to those with a “need to know” for their jobs.216  The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) issued a final rule outlining access procedures to critical energy
infrastructure information (CEII), an SBU category it uses only for information that
is exempt from disclosure under FOIA but that it makes available to those with a
“need to know.”  A congressional witness criticized this policy: 
The most glaring problem with FERC’s policy is that it is based on the
assumption that this information is exempt from disclosure under FOIA.
However, FERC’s claims are based not on any court-accepted interpretation of
FOIA, but on the Justice Department’s potpourri of possible exemptions. ...The
other problem is that FERC wanted to continued to share this information during
its proceedings, requiring it to create a non-FOIA process of disclosure to those
parties with a ‘need to know,’ which required parties to sign a nondisclosure
agreement.  It is difficult to see how information that was previously public could
become non-public based solely on agency regulations.217
Reportedly in 2006, controversy arose between Connecticut’s State Attorney
General and FERC about the state’s attempt to access information regarding a
proposed Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) plant.  The state sought information to review
design and safety considerations and to determine whether building the plant would
endanger the health and safety of state residents.  Reportedly, FERC says the
information is not publicly releasable because it is critical energy infrastructure
information (CEII), a category of “sensitive but unclassifed,” which it says is not
releasable under FOIA.218
According to the USDA, its SBU information, some of which it calls SSI
information, is releasable under FOIA, but that it will process FOIA requests in
accord with the instructions in the Attorney General’s 2001 memo which instructs
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agencies to protect the release of sensitive information under FOIA and to be
cognizant especially of exemptions two, three, four and seven.219  
As indicated above, some agencies require a form of clearance for persons to see
SBU information or a determination that they have a “need to know,” which could
imply exemption from public disclosure.220  Thomas S. Blanton, Director of the
George Washington University National Security Archive, testified at the March 2,
2005 hearing that use of the term SBU thwarts the intent of FOIA and almost forces
government bureaucrats to withhold such information:  
We have heard from officials at the Department of Justice that these new pseudo
classifications are simply guidance for safeguarding information, and do not
change the standards under the Freedom of Information Act.  But such a claim
turns out to be mere semantics:  In every case, the new secrecy stamps tell
government bureaucrats “don’t risk it”; in every case, the new labels signal “find
a reason to withhold.”  In another TSA response to an Archive FOIA request, the
agency released a document labeled “Sensitive But Unclassified” across the top,
and completely blacked out the full text, including the section labeled
“background” - which by definition should have segregable factual information
in it. The document briefed Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge on an
upcoming meeting with the Pakistani Foreign Minister, but evidently officials
could not identify any national security harm from release of the briefing, and
fell back on the new tools of SBU, together with the much-abused “deliberative
process” exemption to the Freedom of Information Act.221
Actions, Including Congressional Action, to Clarify FOIA, with
Implications for SBU.  On February 13, 2006, the American Bar Association
House of Delegates adopted a recommendation, accompanied by a background
report,222 that “urges the Attorney General of the United States to issue a
memorandum to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) officials at federal agencies
clarifying that the designation of agency records as ‘sensitive but unclassified’ cannot
be a basis for withholding agency documents from release.” The recommendation
also called for establishing a standard policy for “ ... designating information as
“sensitive but unclassified; ... the internal handling of such information; ...taking into
account the sensitive nature of such information; and ... ensuring the release of such
information unless exempt under FOIA.” 
Legislative action has been taken to clarify the relationship of some SBU
information to FOIA.  For instance, as noted above, in 2004, Congress tightened
controls on some geospatial information by creating a new FOIA exemption three
category to permit the withholding of some land remote sensing data (Sec. 914 of
P.L. 108-375).  In contrast, during the 109th Congress, H.R. 426, reported out of
committee on June 27, 2005, would expand the applicability and use of remote
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sensing and other geospatial information to address state, local, regional, and tribal
agency needs. 
Additional legislation related to these subjects in the 109th Congress includes S.
622, the “Restoration of Freedom of Information Act of 2005.” It would amend P.L.
107-296, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, by limiting voluntarily submitted
critical infrastructure information provisions in the law that create new exemptions
from FOIA; by modifying the FOIA exemption to information submitted as CII
records to prevent all CII information submitted by industry from being categorized
broadly as an agency record subject to withholding under FOIA; by allowing records
to be shared within and between government agencies; by decriminalizing actions of
legitimate whistleblowers who might use such information; and by not restricting
congressional use or disclosure of voluntarily submitted critical infrastructure
information.  No action has been taken on the bill, which was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
Senator John Cornyn, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights, addressing the alleged lack of
oversight of FOIA and possible over-classification and over-withholding of federal
information, said he planned to hold oversight hearings in the 109th Congress to
examine updates that might be needed in the FOIA law to continue to provide
citizens with access to government information.223  The Senate Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security held
a hearing on March 15, 2005 on this topic and on S. 394, the “Openness in
Government and Freedom of Information: Examining the Open Government Act of
2005.”  Among other things, the bill would amend FOIA with respect to oversight
of requests for information and release of it.  A related house bill is H.R. 867.  No
further action has occurred.  
S. 589, the “Faster FOIA Act of 2005,” would strengthen FOIA by creating an
advisory commission tasked with proposing ways to reduce delays in responding to
FOIA requests and would ensure the efficient and equitable administration of FOIA
throughout the federal government.  It was reported favorably without written report
and approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 17, 2005.  The House
companion, H.R. 1620 was referred to the House Committee on Government
Operations.  No further action has occurred in the House or the Senate. 
S. 1181 requires that any future legislation to establish a new exemption to
FOIA must be stated explicitly within the text of the bill.  Specifically, any future
attempt to create a new so-called “(b)(3) exemption” to FOIA must specifically cite
that section of FOIA.  The bill sets congressional intent that documents should be
available to the public under FOIA unless Congress explicitly creates an exception.
It would prohibit applying the FOIA to matters specifically exempted from disclosure
by a statute (other than open meetings under the Government in the Sunshine Act)
enacted after July 1, 2005, that specifically cite this Act and either: (1) requires that
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the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on
the issue; or (2) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular
types of matters to be withheld.  The Senate approved the bill on June 24, 2005;
subsequently, it was referred to the House Committee on Government Reform.
S. 1873, the “Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of
2005,” introduced in the 109th Congress, would “prepare and strengthen the
biodefenses of the United States against deliberate, accidental, and natural outbreaks
of illness” and would establish a new Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Agency (BARDA), whose activities and information would be
categorically exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
The bill was reported amended without written report by the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, on October 25.  It now awaits action by the
full Senate. There has been opposition to such blanket exemption because reportedly,
no other federal agency has such universal exemption from FOIA.224
Federal Information Systems and Automated Identification
Processes Used for Sensitive Information  
Recognition of federal agency use of the category SBU is illustrated by the need,
often mentioned in GAO reports, for agencies to share sensitive information
especially relating to homeland security,225 and the fact that agencies are developing
implementation policies and information systems to control and transmit this
category of information among those with a need to know it.  In addition, some
agencies have begun to develop encrypted or protected federal information systems
to transmit SBU information to persons who have received approval from an
originator or other form of clearance to use them, including first responders, who
usually need to sign nondisclosure statements and could be punished for violations
of transmittal to third parties.  (For additional information, see Appendix B on
“Illustrations of Federal Information Systems Created to Transmit Sensitive But
Unclassified Information Systems.”)226
In addition, some agencies are using visualization analysis or other automated
processes to identify and control sensitive information.  For instance, the Idaho
National Laboratory, sponsored by DOE in cooperation with Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, reportedly has developed an automated system, a software
program called Mozart, that automates identification of sensitive information on a
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website by “...using advanced intelligence analysis algorithms, [and] provides a
report that can be used to determine if there is sufficient information on a site’s
Internet web pages to compromise sensitive, proprietary, or classified activities or
support adversarial targeting of individuals and programs.”227  As another example,
the Department of Energy contracted with a research group at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas, to develop and install on 3,000 computers a program called the
“Homeland Security Classifier.”  It reads and sorts electronic text documents “by
applying the same rules used by human classifiers” to identify sensitive nonclassified
information, or to categorize a document as releasable.228
Inconsistency in Agencies’ Processes To Identify SBU
Information
Federal agencies use a variety of different concepts of SBU information and
methods to restrict public access to it.  Labels include such terms as FOUO, SSI,
SHSI, CEII, OUO, “limited official use” (LOU), “law enforcement sensitive,” and
“controlled unclassified information.”  A CDC manual identifies at least 14 such
labels that federal agencies use, and other inventories contain 50 or more such
categories.229  
As illustrated by the descriptions in Appendix A, while some agencies use the
FISMA-mandated processes to categorize information and implement information
security protections based on the level of risk associated with unauthorized access,
some agencies continue to use a definition of “sensitive” that is based on the CSA
definition, which leads to identification and implementation policies that are based
on type or content of information or threat.  For instance, the Department of
Homeland Security, in its SBU management directive 11042.1, included the
Computer Security Act and its definition of “sensitive” as the first item under the
heading “Policy and Procedures” that govern the directive, but said “ ... with the
exception of certain types of information protected by statute, specific, standard
criteria and terminology defining the types of information warranting designation as
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‘sensitive information’ does not exist within the federal Government.  Such
designations are left to the discretion of each individual agency.”230 
The OMB still refers to the concept of “sensitive” as it appears in the CSA in
its guidance for information security, Appendix III, “Security of Federal Automated
Information Resources,” of OMB Circular A-130, Transmittal Memorandum #4,
Management of Federal Information Resources, which is dated November 28, 2000,
but is identified on the OMB website as the current circular.231  It says that “[t]he
Appendix ... incorporates requirements of the Computer Security Act of 1987 ... and
responsibilities assigned in applicable national security directives.”  This circular
may be confusing  because, while it acknowledges the need for agencies to use
broader NIST risk-based procedures and guidance to provide information security for
all information,232 it does not mention the FISMA Act or the specific concepts it
embodied.  The Appendix continues, at times, to refer to the narrower CSA concept
of sensitive information that was rendered moot with passage of FISMA.  For
instance, it continues to refer to the CSA’s requirements for agencies to protect
computer systems containing sensitive information, and for the Secretary of
Commerce to “develop and issue appropriate standards and guidances for the security
of sensitive information in federal computer systems.”233 
In a somewhat obscure document — a “note” of July 3, 2003 — the OMB gave
specific guidance to agency Chief Information Officers to use FISMA processes.234
The attached sheets, entitled “Certification and Accreditation — What An Agency
Can Do Now,” refer to FISMA and certain pertinent NIST publications and say “The
need for determining the sensitivity of the information (risk level) as it relates to
high, medium, and low needs for the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
data ... are required in NIST SP 80-18 and must be part of the system security
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plan.”235  It also referred agencies to a then forthcoming document, NIST SP 800-37,
and other documents that it instructed agencies to use.  It admonished that “FISMA
requires assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or destruction of
information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the
agency.”236 
Among other major federal agencies, the Department of the Army and DOD
appear to base some major concepts of SBU on the CSA definition of “sensitive”
information that is not classified.  DHHS clearly appears to use a FISMA-based risk
process; USDA uses a mixed FISMA and CSA approach; agencies that use their own
definitions include DOE, NRC, DOD, NRC, and FERC.  (For an illustration of the
definitions and procedures agencies use to define SBU information and processes to
control it, see Appendix A, “Illustrations of Federal Agency Controls on Sensitive
Information.”)
Activities Relating To Developing a Standard Definition of
SBU Information
Critics have often decried the proliferation of SBU concepts and the resulting
differences in implementation policies — which make it difficult for researchers,
agency staff who label and protect information, and public users to know what
information is, or is to be, labeled SBU. For instance, Representative Henry A.
Waxman, ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Government
Reform, in a March 1, 2005 letter to the Chairman of the Committee’s Subcommittee
on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, criticized the
increasing proliferation of “pseudoclassification” categories like SBU and the fact
that not all documents marked SBU would be legitimate threats to national security
if released.237  During a hearing held on March 2, 2005, on “Emerging Threats:
Overclassification and Pseudoclassification,” he remarked that the term SBU was
used inappropriately to withhold information from the public who need to know it
or to prevent the public from seeing inaccurate or politically embarrassing
documents.238  The DHS, he contended, used the SBU designation to withhold the
identity of the ombudsman that the public is supposed to contact about airline
complaints.239  Mr. Waxman concluded in his letter to the chairman, which was made
part of the hearing record, that “... the executive branch is creating new categories of
‘sensitive but unclassified’ information that ... lack a statutory basis, and there is no
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federal entity monitoring their use.”240  Another witness at the March 2005 hearing
testified that “[t]hese ill-defined categories — be they ‘sensitive but unclassified,’
‘sensitive security information,’ or some form of ‘critical infrastructure information’
 — almost always do more harm than good.  They ... are based on ... an antithetical
proposition in our democracy — that, when in doubt, always favor secrecy over
openness.”241 
Dr. Ron Ross, a principal author of NIST’s security standards mandated by
FISMA, commented that there are
dozens of different definitions of “sensitive unclassified information” across the
federal government. Originators, or information owners, have discretion in
identifying, marking, controlling, protecting, and releasing sensitive unclassified
information resulting in: uneven and inconsistent protection of information
assets; varying degrees of risk resulting from different release criteria; and
inability to share information across organizational boundaries with confidence
and trust.242
William J. Leonard, the director of the Information Security Oversight Office
(ISOO) at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), which
conducts periodic inspections and reviews classification and declassification plans,
criticized the “... lack of common understanding of what exactly sensitive
information is, how to identify it, and how and when to protect it.”243  He emphasized
that the federal government needs a reasonable policy to share or withhold
information and “in many instances, ‘sensitive but unclassified’ is a label without
meaning that is misused by officials who lack the proper ‘training, background or
understanding’ to decide what to withhold.”244  He is reported to have said “The DHS
policy ‘creates an environment exactly opposite ... [from] what we’re trying to do in
the name of information sharing....  It creates an environment of uncertainty.’”245
Workers in government agencies are confronted with a proliferation of many SBU
protection “regimes” and “... will prefer to err on the side of caution, or withholding
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information, out of confusion and/or a fear of getting in trouble.”246  According to
Leonard,
... a water works operator may submit a report of anomalous activity involving
the water authority. Standing by itself, that information may appear innocuous;
however, it may be a critical link, for example, to a public health official dealing
with his or her own anomaly. That public health official should be able to access
and become aware of that information from the waterworks operator without a
supposedly omniscient authority in the middle making singular decisions as to
who should receive the information and who should not. The essence of
information sharing is that the entity on the “edge” should be in a position to
receive the same information as those at the “center.247  
He wrote that consistent standards require a common lexicon, a common
governmental authority responsible to “revalidate and synchronize the various
existing regimes controlling unclassified information,”248 and “... a simplified
framework that can serve as a template for the identification, control and protection
of unclassified information whose dissemination is controlled.”  Among its potential
benefits, such a framework would have “great specificity with respect to what
information is covered and what is not covered [and] limits on who could designate
information as controlled.  It would allow discretion to not use controls “even if the
information is eligible.”  It would have “[b]uilt-in criteria that must be satisfied in
order to place controls on dissemination,” recognize due-diligence standards about
handling and protecting information, a fixed time duration for control, and an appeal
process.”249 
As noted above, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution on February
13, 2006, that among other things called for establishment of a standard policy to
designate, handle, and release such information except if it is exempt under FOIA.
Recognition of the need for basic standardization of homeland security-related,
sensitive,  unclassified information was made by Congress when it enacted section
892 of P.L. 107-296, which mandated presidential issuance of guidance to define
procedures to protect sensitive but unclassified homeland security information.
Guidelines have not been issued as of February 15, 2006.  Also, as already noted in
this report, in December 2005, the President issued instructions to federal agencies
to inventory all their SBU information, the authorities invoked to label it SBU, and
practices used to protect it, with the objective of generating uniform government-
wide standards and procedures for designating, marking, and handling SBU
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information.  In addition, Congress has already addressed certain aspects of how to
define SBU information, and additional proposals are under consideration. 
GAO Study on SSI.  During the 108th Congress, responding to a request by
Representative David Obey and Representative Martin Olav Sabo, the GAO assessed
the DHS’s use of the concept of sensitive security information (SSI) — specifically
the procedures to categorize information as SSI, procedures to remove the SSI label,
review procedures to check the appropriateness of the SSI designation; and
organizational functions relating to taking SSI actions.250  The Members of Congress
were concerned about why information that had already been released to the public,
or seemingly nonsensitive information such as government telephone directories, was
given the label SSI and about how the TSA distinguished between information that
needs to be protected and information the public needs for its own safety.  According
to Congressman Sabo, “GAO found that TSA has no internal control procedures for
SSI designation, and that potentially every TSA employee can stamp something
‘SSI.’”251 The final report was issued as Transportation Security Administration:
Clear Policies and Oversight Need for Designation of Sensitive Security Information,
GAO-05-677, June 2005.
P.L. 109-90 Requires DHS To Improve Use of SSI Categories and
Report to Congress.  In 2005, Congress enacted legislation, based on language
originating in the House and offered by Mr. Sabo as an amendment to the DHS
FY2006 appropriations bill, “to clarify ‘SSI’ policy and procedures including which
staff may appropriately have designation authority.”  According to the Conference
Report, House Report 109-241,  “... because of insufficient management controls,
information that should be in the public domain may be unnecessarily withheld from
public scrutiny....”252 Section 537 on “Sensitive Security Information” of the
enactment, P.L. 109-90, requires the DHS Secretary to ensure that there is an official
within each appropriate office with clear authority to “designate documents as SSI
and to provide clear guidance as to what is SSI material and what is not.”  It noted
that a limited number of appointed officials pursuant to 49 CFR 1520.5(b(1)-(16))
have authority to designate such information.  Section 537 also required the Secretary
to report to the Appropriations “... Committees not later than December 31, 2005 on
“(1) Department-wide policies for designating, coordinating and marking documents
as SSI; (2) Department-wide auditing and accountability procedures for documents
designated and marked as SSI; (3) the total number of SSI coordinators within the
Department; and (4) the total number of staff authorized to designate SSI documents
within the Department.”  According to DHS staff and committee staff, this report has
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been sent to the committees, but may need to be modified.253  Also, by January 31,
2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security is to report to the Appropriations
committees the titles of all documents that were designated by DHS as SSI in their
entirety between October 1, 2005 and December 31, 2005, and for each year
thereafter.  According to DHS staff, this report has been prepared and was
transmitted to the committee..  The Secretary is also charged with providing
examples of DHS guidance on designation of the 16 SSI markings that will “serve
as the primary basis and authority for the marking of DHS information as SSI by
covered persons” (Sec. 537). 
Legislation Introduced on “Pseudo-Classification”.  H.R. 2331, the
“Restore Open Government Act of 2005,” was introduced in the 109th Congress.  It
is similar to H.R. 5073 of the 108th Congress and called for an end to the use of SBU
and FOUO and related terms254 without defining them.  Among other things, it would
revoke the Ashcroft and the Card memos released in 2001 and would seek to curtail
excessive classification.  It would direct the Archivist of the United States to (1)
report on the use of pseudo-classification designations; and (2) promulgate
regulations banning unnecessary pseudo-classification designations and standards for
withholding nonclassified information.  It would restore presumption of disclosure
under FOIA, facilitate public access to critical infrastructure information, address
alleged excessive over-classification, and make it easier to challenge agencies that
are accused of improperly withholding information.  The bill was referred to two
committees, House Government Reform and House Homeland Security.  No action
has been taken on the bill.
GAO Study on SBU.  The GAO is inventorying and reviewing selected
federal agencies’ policies and procedures relating to the handling of SBU information
in response to requests made by Representative Tom Davis, Chairman, House
Committee on Government Reform; Representative Todd Platt, Chairman, House
Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Management,
Finance and Accountability; Representative Christopher Shays, House Committee
on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations; and Senator Susan Collins, Chairman, Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The study will look at agency use of
such information control terms as SBU, FOUO, LOU, law defense controlled
unclassified information, and others.  The report is expected to be finished in March
2006.255
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Option To Monitor Agency Use of Risk-based Standards for
Sensitive Unclassified Information
As noted above, some agencies appear not to have implemented procedures as
prescribed in FISMA to protect information, including sensitive information, with
controls based on risk of release.  Some may ask, why have they not done so?
Agencies may not know that the CSA “sensitive information” definition was
rendered moot, especially because major agencies, including OMB and DHS, still
reference CSA and use the term in various documents and guidances.  The CSA
definition may be easy to use since it is broad and has been used for almost 20 years.
It is possible that some agencies may not be fully aware that the E-Government Act
extends to handling of all types of information, including what they categorize as
SBU or sensitive information.  Slow compliance with the FISMA guidance may also
be due to the fact that NIST has not yet formally released the final volume in its FIPS
series — the volume cataloguing actions agencies can take to protect information at
various levels of risk.  However,  the preceding volumes, which give agencies
guidance on procedures to use to define information types and risk levels, have all
been released.  Also, according to GAO, Inspector General reports, and testimony in
various congressional hearings, many agencies have not yet formally incorporated an
overall risk management program into their information security policies because
they are slow to implement the legislative mandates or are finding it too expensive
to comply with the mandates of the E-Government Act.256 
Some information handlers may be wary of the NIST processes because they
believe that risk-based standards prescribed by NIST are too loose for their
circumstances, the threats, and the potentially malevolent uses of information
confronting their agency. They may believe that the use of such standards would
permit the release of sensitive information that should be protected or that risk-based
analysis may not be rigorous enough.257  Also, agencies may be aware of NIST risk-
based standards, but may choose to use other procedures since the law allows
agencies to use more stringent procedures to protect information if, in their
determination, agencies recognize the NIST standards as mandatory minium
standards. 
Despite the fact that OMB does not require formal, detailed risk analyses to be
conducted, some agencies may not be eager to comply with FISMA, because they
might believe that risk-based analyses might be expensive to conduct, or might lead
to categorizing a lot of information (whose impact levels might be mixed for the
three categories of confidentiality, accessability, and integrity) at the highest level of
impact or risk (for any one of the three impacts).  Although this might lessen the cost
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of protection (or raise it), it might also require protecting some information which
does not need to be safeguarded at such a stringent level.258  
Two oversight issues are suggested by these observations.  One is to monitor
federal agency compliance with FISMA, especially the use of NIST-generated, risk-
based standards and information protection procedures to identify and protect all
information, including sensitive unclassified information.  Another is that in light of
the potential confusion resulting from the language of Appendix III to OMB Circular
A-130 regarding the basis of agency information security responsibilities, Congress
may seek to oversee updating of the appendix document. 
 
Recommendations to Institute Better Governance of SBU
Information Procedures
A number of recommendations have been made relating to improving
procedures used to administer SBU controls.  It is possible that some of these issues
may be addressed by the executive branch pursuant to the President’s memo of
December 16, 2005.  
Limit the Number of Persons Who Can Designate SBU.  As noted
above, especially in the comments of ISSO Director Leonard and others, many
governmental officials can stamp a document SBU.  It was reported that although a
limited number of government personnel (estimated at more than 4,000)259 can stamp
classified documents “top secret” (which can be declassified after review according
to a regular schedule, or whose classification can be appealed), many more
employees can stamp documents SBU (whose designation is not on a schedule to be
reviewed or changed and for which there are no appeal process.)  Specific comments
in this regard were made about DHS’s SBU policies:
the new FOUO information policy is actually more far-reaching than national
security classification policy.  Thus, classified information can only be generated
by officials who have been authorized by the President, either directly or
indirectly by delegation.  But any DHS employee or contractor can designate
information a FOUO if it falls within eleven broad categories.  Moreover,
managers and supervisors can also designate additional information as FOUO
even if it falls outside of those categories.  Further, the classification system
provide for an oversight mechanisms through the Information Security Oversight
Office.  No provision for oversight of the new FOUO policy is included.260
One option for policymakers may be to consider limiting the number of persons who
can designate information as SBU.  This option might have other consequences.  It
could force agencies to develop formal systems to categorize SBU information, with
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the designation responsibility limited to a few selected individuals, similar to national
security information “classification” procedures.  Such a development could also
legitimize SBU designation as a formal classification category and cause added
expense to agencies. 
Options To Centralize Policy Control for SBU Information.  The
President’s December 16, 2005 memo appears to have centralized the development
of SBU policies in the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who is to develop
policy “in coordination with the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense,
Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and the
Attorney General and in consultation with all others heads of relevant executive
departments and agencies....”261  Control by the DNI may imply the development of
SBU information control policies that may be more restrictive than some critics
would prefer.262  
There are also proposals to establish a central authority elsewhere in the federal
government to develop policy and guidelines for SBU information — such as in
OMB, the NARA’s Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), the Interagency
Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), or within the judicial system.  For
instance, a report released in December 2004 by the Heritage Foundation and the
Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded that centralization, perhaps
in OMB, could assist in inventorying which information might be sensitive and in
developing standardized policies: 
To date, there has been no systematic review of what government information
that is now or was formerly in the public domain could be used as a “terrorist
roadmap,” the likelihood of such a threat, the role that such information would
play in terrorists’ preparation (including possibilities of alternative sources of the
same information), and the countervailing public safety and other benefits of
providing different types of information.  Furthermore, no authority is clearly
designated to make these evaluations at a national policy level.  Current
evaluations are conducted at the departmental level at best or on an ad hoc, office
by-office basis.  Nor has DHS provided any leadership or guidance to the private
sector about how the private sector might develop voluntary standards for
making decisions about its own disclosures of sensitive information, even
without governmental restrictions.  For government decisions, there is no single
designated authority — in the Office of Management and Budget or elsewhere
—  for determining the overall policy interests and objectives of information
distribution, including common baseline standards to help weigh the benefits and
risks of providing the public with specific types of information, regardless of
which agencies possess the information.  Such a single authority might act as the
CRS-67
263 Carafano and Heyman, pp. 20-21.
264 Joe Fitzgerald and Antonia Badway, “Government Secrecy In the Age of
Information,”Biodefense Quarterly, Summer 2003, p. 2. 
265 Flying Blind: The Rise, Fall, and Possible Resurrection of Science Policy Advice in the
US, Federation of American Scientists, 2004, by Henry Kelly, Ivan Oelrich, Steven
Aftergood, Benn H. Tannenbaum, pp. 63-64.
266 Harry Hammitt in testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International Relations, Mar. 2, 2005, p. 8-9.
267 The Unintended Audience: Balancing Openness and Secrecy, op. cit., p. iii.
overall reviewer of agencies’ public disclosure policies and their implementation
of these policies....263 
Similarly, Steven Aftergood, editor of Secrecy News, was reported to have
observed that federal agency actions that declare SBU information exempt from
FOIA may need better policy guidance and that [i]t may ultimately require judicial
action or congressional intervention to define clearer standards for what may be
withheld and what must be disclosed.”264  A 2004 Federation of American Scientists’
report concluded that oversight of SBU information designations and policy might
benefit from coverage in ISOO or ISCAP.  It recommended that 
[t]he President could direct the ISOO to expand its portfolio to encompass such
sensitive but unclassified information, though to be effective this would require
an infusion of new personnel and resources to an organization that is stretched
thin. Similarly, the President could task ISCAP to receive and evaluate
challenges to controls that have been imposed on unclassified information, in
addition to its current oversight of classified information. To avoid diluting or
diverting the efforts of these existing entities, it may be preferable to devise a
new organization or interagency panel that can tackle controls on unclassified
information, while bolstering the work already being performed on oversight of
classified information.265
An Appeals Process.  The need for an appeals process for SBU information
has been stressed by critics who allege that the SBU labeling system is more
restrictive than federal national security information classification systems.  For
instance, in testimony, Hammitt contended that “... remedies to challenge the
designation of such information must be made available.  Requesters must not be
forced to go to court as their only alternative.  Instead, a process akin to mandatory
declassification review should be instituted.”  He also argued, “Along these same
lines, time limits for protection should be considered and implemented. Sensitive
information may well be sensitive for a period of time and lose its sensitivity
thereafter.  Once information is no longer sensitive it should be made publicly
available. [The National Archives usually declassifies most material after 25 years,
except for nuclear-related information.].”266 Gansler and Lucyshyn recommended that
the National Archives and Records Administration develop and administer an appeals
process to allow individual  decisions about release of information on a case-by-case
basis.267
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Other Remaining Issues and Unanswered Questions  
Policymakers may encounter some remaining unanswered questions.  Is
communication  between the intelligence community and the scientific communities
adequate enough to enable researchers to identify information that should be
protected to prevent terrorists from gaining knowledge to harm the United States?
Do SBU controls constitute another type of classification system?  Just how much
scientific and technical information is being withheld under various SBU
designations and how has such withholding affected the conduct of research and
development and the use of scientific and technical information in  policymaking?
Should special considerations be given to allow access to scientific and technical
information, especially that produced by universities, since the academic sector has
a unique role as a generator of knowledge as a public good and as a significant
“engine” of industrial innovation?  Will DHS’s SBU controls on “developing
technology or current technology” affect information generated by DHS-funded
research and development grants and contracts?  Can risk-based procedures be used
effectively to control access to, and dissemination of, scientific and technical
information, and can they effectively balance access and control?  Would the use of
risk-based procedures generate control procedures different from those used in
existing SBU information control systems?  What is the cost (administrative and
financial) of SBU information  control regimes, the actions needed to implement
them, and to safeguard SBU information  indefinitely?  Would there be a significant
difference in cost-effectiveness calculations for implementing risk-based analysis
procedures versus some of the currently used SBU procedures?  Should there be
monitoring of the use and effects on scientific communication of governmental and
private sector voluntary information control procedures?  Who should conduct such
monitoring? 
The President, the Congress, and the scientific community have initiated steps
to answer some of these questions.  The ongoing activities — to inventory agency
activities, to oversee agency policies and procedures, to clarify terminology, and to
develop professional groups’ codes of conduct and voluntary control procedures —
may foster practices that are compatible with the continuous growth of scientific
knowledge and dynamics in the emergence of new threats.  Competing stakeholder
demands will continue to confront Congress and the executive branch as policies are
refined to balance security and access to scientific information.
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Appendix A. Illustrations of Federal Agency
Controls on Sensitive Information
The following information illustrates how agencies define SBU information and
the procedures they use to control it.  Because agency policies are difficult to obtain,
the information in this section is meant to be illustrative and is limited to what is
readily accessible.  It divides agency descriptions into four categories: (1) Agencies
that use the definition of “sensitive”as found in the Computer Security Act; (2)
Agencies that use FISMA guidelines or risk-based procedures to develop information
security policies; (3)  Agencies that mix use of SBU and FISMA concepts; and (4)
Agencies that use unique definitions.
Agencies That Use the Definition of “Sensitive” as Found in
the Computer Security Act (CSA) 
Some agencies use the CSA definition of sensitive, which identifies information
based on its content, not on the risk of release.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Department of Homeland
Security in a management directive applicable within the agency, released first in
2004 and then revised in January 2005, cited the CSA, P.L. 100-235, and repeated
the law’s now rescinded definition of “sensitive information” as the first element of
policy guiding the directive.  It does not necessarily endorse use of this definition but
says that  “specific, standard criteria and terminology defining the types of
information warranting designation as ‘sensitive information’ does not exist within
the federal government. Such designations are left to the discretion of each individual
agency.”268
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  Appendix III, “Security of
Federal Automated Information Resources,” of OMB Circular A-130, Transmittal
Memorandum #4, Management of Federal Information Resources, which is dated
November 28, 2000, but is identified on the OMB website in November 2005 as the
current circular, references the CSA, but not the FISMA Act.  The appendix
establishes “a minimum set of controls to be included in Federal automated
information security programs; assigns Federal agency responsibilities for the
security of automated information; and links agency automated information security
programs and agency management control systems established in accordance with
OMB Circular No. A-123.”  Its guidance could lead to confusion because  while it
acknowledges the need to use NIST-generated risk-based procedures to protect all
kinds of information (not only sensitive information), it says that “[t]he Appendix ...
incorporates requirements of the Computer Security Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-235) and
responsibilities assigned in applicable national security directives”269 It continues to
use the term “sensitive” and references CSA’s requirements for agencies to protect
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computer systems containing sensitive information and the Secretary of Commerce’s
responsibilities to promulgate standards to protect sensitive information.  Guidance
issued to a limited CIO readership makes explicit reference to NIST’s post-FISMA
responsibilities and for agencies to use mandatory, risk-based security standards
issued by NIST.
Department of the Army.  The Department of the Army uses the term
“Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Not Subject to Public Disclosure” as
including the “categories of ‘for official use only,’ ‘sensitive but unclassified,’ which
formerly was called ‘limited official use,’ ‘sea sensitive information,’ ‘DOD
unclassified controlled nuclear information,’ and ‘sensitive information’ as defined
in the Computer Security Act of 1987.”270  CUI “ ... includes U.S. information that
is determined to be exempt from public disclosure in accordance with DOD
Directives 5230.25 and 5400.7 or that is subject to export controls in accordance with
the International Traffic in Arms Regulation or the Export Administration
Regulation.”  For example:
These types of information include but are not limited to: patent secrecy data,
confidential medical records, inter-and intra-agency memoranda that are
deliberative in nature, certain data compiled for law enforcement purposes, data
obtained from a company on a confidential basis employee personal data,
internal rules and practices of a government agency that, if released would
circumvent agency policy and impede the agency in the conduct of its mission;
and finally technical controlled unclassified information.271
National Security Agency.  In a 2003 document that appears to still be
active, the National Security Agency used the CSA definition to define the term
“sensitive information” as “information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to
or modification of, that could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of
federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under 5 U.S.C.
Section 552a (the Privacy Act), but that has not been specifically authorized under
criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified
in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.”  Expanding this definition, it
said “(Systems that are not national security systems, but contain sensitive
information, are to be protected in accordance with the requirements of the Computer
Security Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-235).)”272
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  CDC’s 2005
policy on SBU information was issued in an information security manual on July 22,
2005.273  Applicable to all employees and contractors, the manual covers information
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Unclassifed Information,” Manual Guide-Information Security CDC-02, as first reported in
“CDC Issues Policy on Sensitive But Unclassified Info,” Secrecy News, Aug. 2, 2005. 
2 7 4  CDC, Sensit ive But Unclassif ied,  February 2006, posted at
[http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/cdc-sbu-2006.html],  by Steven Aftergood, Secrecy News,
Feb. 27, 2006. 
275 Sensitive Information Protection Manual, p. 1, attached to the directive. 
276 Manual, op. cit., p. 3. 
“sensitive enough to require protection from public disclosure — for one or more
reasons outlined under the exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act, but may
not otherwise be designated as national security information.”  It identified and
defined categories of “sensitive but unclassified” information, including one labeled
“Computer Security Act Sensitive Information” which it defined as in the CSA,
which it cited as the source.  The other categories of information CDC defined as
SBU include “Contractor Access Restricted Information,” “Controlled Unclassified
Information,” “DEA Sensitive,” “Department of State Sensitive But Unclassified,”
“DOE Official Use Only,” “Export Controlled Information (or material),” “For
Official Use Only,” “GSA Sensitive But Unclassified Building Information,” “Law
Enforcement Sensitive,” “Operations Security Protected Information,” “Privacy Act
Protected Information,” “Select Agent Sensitive Information,” and “Unclassified
Controlled Nuclear Information.”  All CDC information has to be reviewed for
security and approved before release; relevant information will be protected and
encrypted for electronic transmittal, and some aggregated information may qualify
as SBU.  Violations of the policy may result in civil or criminal action.  Healthcare
information and public health data and statistics would not be “potentially sensitive.”
This policy was modified in 2006 to require that if a request is received for a
document marked SBU, it should be reviewed to determine whether it qualifies for
an exemption under FOIA and withholding from release.274
International Boundary and Water Commission (USIBWC).  The U.S.
section of the International Boundary and Water Commission between the United
States and Mexico issued a directive on July 8, 2005, that establishes a policy of
“sensitive information protection.” Sensitive information is defined similar to, but
more broadly than, the definition used in the CSA as 
unclassified information of a sensitive nature not otherwise categorized by
federal statute or regulation and the unauthorized disclosure, loss, or misuse of
which could adversely impact on the following; a persons’ privacy or welfare;
the conduct of federal programs; or the conduct of other programs or operations
essential to the national interest.275 
Among the types of information to be treated as sensitive are information
exempt from disclosure under FOIA and the Privacy Act, information technology
information, and USIBWC internal security measures, including emergency
management plans, physical security plans and reports that disclose facility
infrastructure or security vulnerabilities, continuity of operations plans, risk
management plans, and accreditation and recertification documentation.276 Such
information is to be released only to those who have a “need to  know”, protections
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are required for storage and transmittal, and penalties are imposed for disclosure,
including suspension and removal. 
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. The
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, funded by the
Department of Energy (DOE), said in 2003 that DOE in its 1995 safeguards and
security glossary defined “sensitive” substantially similar to the way it is defined in
the CSA.  It then offered a definition that is broader than the one in the CSA: 
Information for which disclosure, loss, misuse, alteration, or destruction could
adversely affect national security or government interests.  National security
interests are those unclassified matters that relate to the national defense or
foreign relations of the U.S. government.  Governmental interests are those
related, but not limited to the wide range of government or government-derived
economic, human, financial, industrial, agriculture, technological, and law
enforcement information, as well as the privacy or confidentiality of personal or
commercial propriety information provided the U.S. government by its
citizens.277
Agencies That Use FISMA Guidelines or Risk-Based
Procedures To Develop Information Security Policies
Some agencies use clearly identified risk-based or FISMA-derived guidelines
to develop information security policies. 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).  DHHS’s policy
guidance, entitled Information Security Program Policy, December 15, 2004,278 and
its  Information Security Program Handbook, November 12, 2004, contain policy
and implementation plans that appear to conform with the NIST guidance documents.
They specify that sensitive information that is not subject to national security controls
should be protected by a process that includes risk assessments that incorporate threat
and vulnerability analyses and development of security programs according to the
level of risk involved.  The authorities cited for these actions do not refer specifically
to homeland security guidance materials, but instead to FISMA, the Clinger-Cohen
Act, the Information Technology Management Reform Act (Division E of P.L. 104-
106), and OMB Circular A-130.279  DHHS said it also incorporates the requirements
specified in relevant executive orders, Homeland Security Presidential Directives,
NIST Special Publications, and so forth.  In the DHHS documents, implementation
procedures include background checks for accessibility to sensitive information,
nondisclosure agreements, protection and encryption procedures, and so forth.  These
documents apply to information systems, including hardware, software, and data on
them of any sensitivity or classification.280  Use of these concepts replaces the use of
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pp. 1, 32,  and Information Security Program: Information Security Program Policy, Dec.
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281 DHHS still referred to the Computer Security Act in its now superceded 2005 update of
its Automated Information Systems Security Programs Handbook to note that sensitive
unclassified agency information should be given the security-level designation “high
sensitivity” (the two lower are “low” and “moderate”) and should use the next highest level
of “high and national security interests” if the loss of it could adversely affect national
security interests.  DHHS is also developing a new Automated Information Technology
Security Program to “document and evaluate the existence and reliability of the Automated
Information System Security Program at selected operating divisions. This program helps
to protect information resources in compliance with the Computer Security Act of 1987 and
the directives of OMB and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.”  It used the
CSA definition of sensitive in DHHS Automated Information Systems Security Program
Handbook, available at [http://wwwoirm.nih.gov/policy/aissp.html#OverviewII].  This
handbook was superceded by the 2004 documents identified in the text above.  Reference
to protection of information resources in compliance with the CSA and use of the term
“sensitive” appears to have ceased after last used in HHS/OG Fiscal Year 2005 Work Plan
 — Department-wide, p. 5, [http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/workplan/2005
/2005WPDptwd.pdf].
282  “Information Security Challenge for J9 Marking Controlled Unclassified Information
(CUI), [Slide show], by Bob Craig, INFOSEC Policy Analyst Briefing to the Joint Concept
Development Pathway, as of Mar. 18, 2005. 
283 Craig, Slides, Mar. 18, 2005. 
284 Appendix 3: “Controlled Unclassified Information,” of Interim Information Security
Guidance, Apr. 16, 2004, on changes to DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Jan. 1997.
285 Interviews of Robert Craig, January and March 2005 and Craig, Slides, Mar. 18, 2005.
the term “sensitive” and of the CSA concepts, which DHHS appears to have halted
in 2004.281
Military Joint Futures Laboratory.  The Military Joint Futures Laboratory
of the U.S. Joint Forces Command is conducting a study of implementation of SBU
information policies and procedures in military programs.  Pursuant to DOD
guidance, “All DOD unclassified information must be reviewed before it is released
to the public or to foreign governments and international organizations.”282  That
which is not released in accordance with national laws, policies, and regulations of
the originating country283 shall be stamped FOUO and access control and protection
procedures applied.  These kinds of information include, but are not limited to, For
Official Use Only, Law Enforcement Sensitive, Sensitive But Unclassified, Limited
Official Use Only, and Limited Distribution.284 According an information security
analyst, “controlled unclassified information” (CUI) lacks a clear definition, policy
guidance, or central authority to develop and mandate control policies. Only the
originator of the information can authorize disclosure or release.  He suggests using
NIST documents and guidance to identify CUI and to conduct threat and
vulnerability analysis for information.285 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC).  ISACs are private
organizations that collect, distribute, analyze, and share sensitive information
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regarding threats, vulnerabilities, alerts and best practices to protect national critical
infrastructures in fields such as chemistry, electricity, energy, financial services,
healthcare, information technology, public transit, surface transportation,
telecommunications, and water, physical, and cyber security critical infrastructures.286
They were established in response to Presidential Directive 63, 1998, which
mandated that the public and private sectors share information about physical and
cyber security threats and vulnerabilities to help protect U.S. critical infrastructures.
The directive was updated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 in 2003.
The ISAC information sharing process developed a categorization scheme for
unclassified government data, as well as data originating from ISAC members,
“based upon level of sensitivity.”  Vetting of the data is to address four levels.  The
most restrictive is “Privileged Information/Restricted Use (Level 3) - Information that
should only be distributed to individuals who must act, analyze, or make decisions
based on the data.  Distribute only to individuals with Level 3 Background check.
This should include Government ‘Sensitive But Unclassified’ information and
similar very close-hold information.”287  A level 3 background check “[r]equires 10
years of history immediately prior to the background check. Includes felony checks
from all jurisdictions in which subject readied during period.  Includes scan of
additional databases, and personal interviews.  Requires recertification every 3
years.”288 
Agencies That Mix Use of CSA and FISMA Concepts
Agencies that use mixed models of the CSA definition and risk-based guidelines
include USDA and a DOE-affiliated agency. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  The Department of Agriculture (USDA)
promulgated regulations requiring its constituent agencies to issue criteria and
directives to identify “sensitive security information,” defined as unclassified
information that if publicly disclosed could be expected to have a “harmful impact
on the security of person, place, or property.”  Among the science and technology-
related “USDA SSI possibilities” it identified “building vulnerabilities, ... select
agent pathogen locations, ... USDA computer infrastructure details, rural
development management control review that reveal vulnerabilities, ... the ARS
report Strategic Research Targets to Potential American Livestock and Poultry from
Biological Threat Agents, ... security assessment of USDA Non-BSL-03 laboratories,
[and] local pathogen inventories for USDA non-BSL-3 laboratories....”289  Such
information should be identified and protected after an informal “... risk analysis and
determination to identify potential threats and appropriate vulnerabilities to SSI in
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of “Sensitive Security Information,” at [http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/usda3440-02].
Although risk analysis is required, no reference was made to using NIST-promulgated
security standards or methodology to determine risk level and security level. 
291 Regulation 3440-002, op. cit.
292 “Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Information Protection,” Chapter 10, Part 2, DM
3550-002, Feb. 17, 2005.
293 “Conditional Access to USDA Sensitive but Unclassified Information,” Nondisclosure
Agreement. Attached to DM 3550-002.
294 According to WAPA, “Western Area Power Administration markets and delivers reliable,
cost-based hydroelectric power and related services within a 15-state region of the central
and western U.S. We’re one of four power marketing administrations within the U.S.
Department of Energy whose role is to market and transmit electricity from multi-use water
projects. Our transmission system carries electricity from 55 hydropower plants operated
by the Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the International
Boundary and Water Commission.” Available at [http://www.wapa.gov/about/default.htm].
295 This was identified as “WAPA P 471.1, “Identifying and Protecting Official Use Only
Information,” that states Western’s intent to follow DOE Order 471.3, “Identification and
Protection of Official Use Only Information”(Susan DeBelle, “ ‘Official Use’ Info Requires
Special Care,” Closed Circuit, May 28, 2004, vol. 26, no. 11,
[http://www.wapa.gov/media/cct/2004/may28/26no114txt.htm]).
their custody.” 290 Only those who have a “need to know” are to have access to SSI.
Need-to-know determinations are to be made by an authorized holder of SSI who
attests that a prospective recipient requires access to perform or assist in a lawful and
authorized governmental function. Information designated “SSI” should be protected
no longer than 10 years, unless a designating official determines otherwise.  SSI
information is releasable under FOIA, but requests for such information should be
processed in accord with the October 10, 2001 Attorney General’s memorandum and
should consider use of FOIA exemptions two, three, four, and seven.291 
On February 17, 2005, USDA promulgated a protection policy for SBU
information, which is different from SSI because it “contains information that is not
security-related but is still sensitive in terms of its risk of exposure.”292  This
information is to be protected and encrypted for transmittal in accord with OMB
Circular A-130 and NIST guidance, some of which is specified.  All employees and
contractors with a “need to know” must sign a nondisclosure agreement and are
subject to penalties of noncompliance.  Information may be processed for FOIA
claims, but it should be considered for protection in light of the Attorney General’s
memorandum.  SBU is defined as in CSA, but without identifying the source as the
CSA.293
Western Area Power Administration (WAPA).  The Western Area Power
Administration, (WAPA),  an entity of the U.S. Department of Energy,294 issued
guidance for handling sensitive information that it said conforms with Department
of Energy policy.295  “OUO information,” it declared, “must ... be unclassified; could
be used to damage government, commercial or private interests; [and] be exempt
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300 “Interim Guidance on Safeguarding and Controlled Unclassifed Information,” Attached
to Interim Information Security Guidance,” from Stephen A. Cambone, Undersecretary of
Defense, Memo for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al., Apr. 16, 2004, p. 6.
301 Attachment to Cambone, op. cit., p. 2.
from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.”296  All such documents must
be marked and protected as directed “in the DOE Manual for Identifying and
Protecting Official Use Only Information.”297  Even information releasable under
FOIA should be protected if it is sensitive (such as “total flow on a specified
grouping of transmission lines maps and environmental impact statements that were
previously posted on the Internet.”)  Specifically, for such information, it
recommends posting “ a summary of the information on the Internet; or provid[ing]
information that will enable a reader to request a copy of the document. This will
give you an opportunity to determine whether or not the requester has a legitimate
need for the material.”298  Protections should be applied to information that meets
certain criteria, including the  technology-related dimensions of whether it contains
“details about critical operating facilities, systems or vulnerabilities”; could have
questionable impacts if “it inadvertently reached an unintended audience”; could
provide”details concerning physical or cyber security measures”; could be
“dangerous if it were used in conjunction with other publicly available information”;
could be used “to target Western staff, facilities or operations”; or could “increase the
attractiveness of a critical infrastructure asset as a target.”299 
Agencies That Use Unique Definitions
Some agencies have developed their own definitions of sensitive information
that do not reference either the CSA or NIST-based standards.
Department of Defense.  DOD uses the following definition for SBU:  For
“[a]ccess within the Department of Defense, the criteria for allowing access to SBU
information are the same as those used for FOUO information, except that
information received from the Department of State marked SBU shall not be
provided to any person who is not a U.S. citizen without the approval of the
Department of State activity that originated the information.”300  “For official use
only” information is for unclassified information and “is applied to information that
may be exempt under one or more of the other eight exemptions [to FOIA, the first
exception is for classified information].”301  However, marking it FOUO does not
automatically qualify it for an exemption from FOIA.  Access is granted to those with
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304 DOE, “Commission on Science and Security in the 21st Century, DOE accompanied by
Recommendations,” June 20, 2002.  The statement referenced the DOE document Subject:
Identifying and Protecting Official Use Only Information, DOE Order M 471.3-1, Apr. 9,
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pp. 4, 6 in DOE Information Classification and Control Policy Communique, Feb. 2004.
306 Ray Holmer, “Sensitive Information on the Web, an Information Security Perspective,”
STIP Meeting May 1, 2003.
a need for such access, and such information should be stored in locked files and
unauthorized disclosure will be punished by “appropriate disciplinary action.”302
Department of the Army. The Department of the Army uses the term
“Technical controlled unclassified information,” pursuant to P.L. 98-94, for data
“that disclose critical technology with military or space applications.  This includes
any blueprint, drawing, plan, instruction, computer software and documentation, or
other technical information that can be used or be adapted to design, engineer,
produce, manufacture, operate, repair, overhaul, or reproduce any military or space
equipment or technology concerning such equipment.”303
Department of Energy. The DOE uses the term “official use only” for
“sensitive” information that is unclassified. As one of its responses to the
recommendations of the Commission on Science and Security in the 21st century, the
DOE said it prepared “...a new Official Use Only (OUO) Information Order
[completed in June 2002 and current through April 2007], aimed at addressing the
issue of ‘Sensitive, But Unclassified Information’ through the establishment of three
information types (classified, unclassified and Official Use Only.)”304  “To be
identified as OUO, information must be unclassified; have the potential to damage
governmental, commercial, or private interests if disseminated to persons who do not
need to know the information to perform their jobs or other DOE-authorized
activities” and fall under at least one of FOIA exemptions two through nine, Access
to documents marked OUO is limited to persons who need it to perform their jobs or
other DOE-authorized activities.  Documents need to be protected as described in
DOE M 471.3-1, and administrative penalties may be imposed on DOE employees
for improperly marking or releasing a OUO document.  These provisions are
applicable to all DOE elements and contractors.305  An official with DOE’s
Safeguards and Security Policy staff interpreted DOE’s rules with respect to SBU
science and technology information, which, he said, encompasses such things as
“facilities, personnel, programs, materials, security, safety assessment,
vulnerabilities, and the sensitive subjects list.”306  Officials charged with categorizing
information are to take the following “considerations” into account when deciding
if information is sensitive: “suitability — what does it do for the person,
organization, Department; sensitivity — how can it be used by an adversary?; risk —
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what are the chances of an adversary using the information?; consequences — what
could happen if an adversary used the information?”307
DOE also maintains a Sensitive Subjects List, used largely by affiliated national
laboratories, that identifies sensitive information deemed significant to U.S. national
security.  It is an internal DOE list to be used to identify fields that require a U.S.
export license for a  foreign national.  Topics included relate to nuclear weapons and
nuclear fuel cycle, rockets, missiles, and delivery systems; conventional arms and
other defense-related technology; chemical and biological weapons; advanced
scientific computers and software; and business sensitive (proprietary) information.308
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
issued rules for “Safeguards Information” (SGI) — that is, unclassified sensitive
information deemed too sensitive for public release.  The proposed rule, issued in
February 2005, said that SGI needs to be protected from unauthorized disclosure
under section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended.  The proposed rule
expanded the scope of information included and made more rigorous standards and
requirements for background checks and fingerprinting for those who have a “need
to know” to see the information.309  The definition was promulgated in a release
issued on May 11, 2005: “While SGI is considered to be sensitive unclassified
information, its handling and protection more closely resemble the handling of
classified confidential information than other sensitive unclassified information.”310
“Sensitive unclassified information,” according to NRC,  
is generally not publicly available and encompasses a wide variety of categories
(e.g., personnel privacy, attorney-client privilege, confidential source, etc.).
Information about a licensee’s or applicant’s physical protection or material
control and accounting program for special nuclear material not otherwise
designated as Safeguards Information or classified as National Security
Information or Restricted Data is required by 10 CFR 2.390 to be protected in the
same manner as commercial or financial information, i.e., they are exempt from
public disclosure.311
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.  The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a final rule outlining access procedures to
critical energy infrastructure information (CEII), an SBU category it uses.  CEII is
technical information submitted from companies and utilities during regulatory
proceedings.  Before September 11, 2001 most of this information was made public.
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313 E.O. 13356, “Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans,”
Aug. 27, 2004.
314 E.O. 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” Aug. 27, 2004.
315 Government Accountability Office, Information Technology: Major Federal Networks
That Support Homeland Security Functions, Sept. 2004, GAO-04-375. 
316 Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland
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FERC’s position is that CEII includes only information that is exempt from
disclosure under FOIA.  It also said it developed a process to allow requests to be
made for information that is not already publicly available under FOIA, but also will
keep sensitive infrastructure information out of the public domain in order to help
deter terrorist attacks.  The rule noted that the FOIA exemptions most likely to apply
to CEII are exemptions two, four, and seven.312
Appendix B. Illustrations of Federal Information
Systems Created To Transmit Sensitive But
Unclassified Information 
Federal agencies have started to develop information systems to share SBU
information and data among themselves and with state and local first responders.
Some of these were mandated by statute. The major legal authorities include the
Homeland Security Information Sharing Act, section 892 of P.L. 107-296, which
required the development of information sharing procedures for certain types of
homeland security information; Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-7),
which required DHS to produce a national infrastructure protection plan summarizing
initiatives to share information among public and private sectors; the issuance in
August 2004 of executive orders to strengthen terrorism information sharing
standards,313 establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center;314 as well as
passage in December 2004 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004, P.L. 108-458, which required the establishment of an information-sharing
environment (ISE) and ISE council to exchange terrorism information among pubic
and private entities.  
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Inventory
The GAO reported to Congress in September 2004315 that its survey showed that
nine federal agencies316 had developed 34 networks to share information in support
of homeland security functions. These include networks such as DHS’s Critical
Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CWIN).  Five agencies, DHS, DOD,
DOJ, State, and Treasury managed 18 networks (17 operational and one in
development) for SBU information. (SBU  “is a generic term used to describe
unclassified information that is (1) not required by law to be made available to the
public, and (2) sufficiently sensitive to restrict access from public disclosure, but not
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sensitive enough to warrant a classified designation.”317)  Of these, 11 were networks
that shared information internally only within an agency, 2 were networks that shared
information only with other federal agencies, and 5 networks shared information with
state and local government agencies or the private sector.318  
Most of the systems permit information dissemination on a “need-to-know”
basis. GAO catalogued many of these requirements and responses in its report High
Risk Series: An Update, released in January 2005.319  See also the aforementioned
CRS Report RL32597.
Other Federal Information Systems
Since the GAO inventory, additional information systems have been identified
that exchange SBU information.320 For instance, DHS is developing a “Homeland
Security Information Network” that will utilize the Joint Regional Information
Exchange to share SBU and classified information with state and local personnel and
the private sector. It was reported in February 2004 that there were about 1,000
users.321  Other networks over which SBU information exchange occurs include the
“Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network,” a government
network between DOD users;322 and the “Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)
TTIC Online system,” a DHS information network for disseminating classified
domestic and international terrorist information from 14 U.S. government agencies,
which is “being updated to support collaboration and information sharing at varying
levels, from Top Secret to Sensitive But Unclassified.”323  There is also the “Multi-
State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange” (MATRIX), a regional system covering
13 states, including Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Ohio, and Utah, which




325 Statement of Maureen A. Baginski, Executive Assistant Director, Intelligence, Federal
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327 According to Federal Technical Data Solution (FEDTeDS), sensitive data with respect
to the solicitation phase of procurement via the Internet includes “information related to
operations, weapons systems and plans, transit authority, structures, individuals and services
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Justice Department uses a system
called “Law Enforcement Online (LEO), a virtual private network that reaches
federal, state, and law enforcement agencies at the Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU)
level.”325  It also “has secure connectivity to the Regional Information Sharing
Systems network (riss.net).”  Reportedly, LEO has about 30,000 users, including
state and local law enforcement members. “LEO makes finished FBI intelligence
products available, including Intelligence Assessments resulting from analysis of
criminal, cyber, and terrorism intelligence.”  The system also provides access to
“Intelligence Information Reports” at the Law Enforcement Sensitive classification
level. “[t]he FBI posted the requirements document on LEO, which provided state
and local law enforcement a shared view of the terrorist threat and the information
needed in every priority area.”  Reportedly, “The FBI will use an enhanced LEO as
the primary channel for sensitive but unclassified communications with other federal,
state and local agencies. LEO and the DHS Joint Regional Information Exchange
System (JRIES) will also be interoperable.”
DHS also launched a system in April 2004 for “state and local emergency
officials across the country ... [to] ... trade preparedness tips, training ideas and best
practices right from their desks on the Lessons Learned Information Sharing system,
LLIS....”326 Reportedly, emergency officials will have to complete an online
authorization process to view the site, whose content “must meet DHS standards for
‘sensitive, but unclassified information....’”
 
FEDTeDS
In addition to these networks, the federal government created FEDTeDS, the
Federal Technical Data Solution.  It is a way to transmit and disseminate security-
sensitive or sensitive but unclassified acquisition material related to solicitations
found in FedBizOpps.gov [http://www.fedbizopps.gov].327  It is a collaborative effort
among agencies, led by DOD, the Coast Guard, and the Integrated Acquisition
Environment (IAE) eGovernment initiative under the President’s Management
Agenda.  Vendors are to use this system to prepare sensitive information in bids or
proposals.  Such information can include specifications, drawing and plans for
federal installations, schedules, procedures, and so forth.  More than 90 federal
agencies are reported to disseminate SBU acquisitions-related materials during the
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solicitation phase of procurement via the Internet; this system serves approved users.
It became operational on February 19, 2003.328  
Section 1016 (b) of P.L. 108-458, the National Intelligence Reform Act (S.
2845,  H.Rept 108-796), the intelligence overhaul bill responsive to the 9/11
commission report, called for development of an “information sharing environment”
that would link information systems and allow users to share information between
agencies, between levels of government,  and with the private sector.  It also
mandated a principal officer and executive committee to create rules and regulations
to implement the information sharing environment.  Reportedly, DHS’s Homeland
Security Advisory Council plans on releasing a report that calls for more information
exchanges from federal to state, local, and private sectors, and vice versa.329
The aforementioned GAO High Risk Series Report concluded that despite these
kinds of efforts, “a great deal of work remains ... to improve homeland security
information sharing, including establishing clear goals, objectives, and expectations
for the many participants in information-sharing efforts; and consolidated,
standardizing, and enhancing federal structures, policies, and capabilities for the
analysis and dissemination of information.”330
